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Abstract: Numerous studies show that religion has a strong association with gender 
role attitudes and family ideology in the U.S. Some religious traditions have fostered 
changes toward modern gender ideologies and others resisted. However, most studies are 
limited to Judeo-Christian contexts. It is not clear whether these patterns apply to societies 
where other religious traditions have been dominant or where gender issues are different – 
for example in a Confucian society like Taiwan. The goal of this study is to understand the 
role of religion in gender and family relations in Chinese societies – particularly marital 
gender roles, educational aspirations, and abortion attitudes and decisions.  
I utilize two large scale nationally representative surveys: the Taiwan Social Change 
Survey and the Knowledge of, Attitudes toward, and the Practice of Contraception 
Survey. My research shows that religion is significantly associated with gender roles and 
family relations in Taiwan. After controlling socio-demographic factors, conservative 
religious groups such as Taiwan Protestants and Yi-Guan-Dao members are more likely 
 ix
to support traditional gender role ideologies. They view women’s fulltime work outside 
of the home as a negative influence on children and family life and are more likely to 
support a traditional men-as-breadwinner women-as-home-maker division of labor, 
compared with Chinese traditional religionists and secular people. Catholics tend to hold 
more liberal views that encourage men’s participation in housework and both spouses’ 
contribution to family finance.  
On abortion attitudes, both devout Christians and Yi-Guan-Dao members tend to 
strongly oppose abortion compared with Chinese traditional religionists and secular 
groups; however, there is no significant association between religion and either timing of 
abortion or patterns of abortion. Nominal Christians actually reported slightly higher 
number of abortions than other groups.  
Finally, there is no significant gender gap between the educational aspirations for 
boy and girl of different religious groups; the difference is in overall educational 
aspirations. Taiwanese Protestants show the highest aspirations and Yi-Guan-Dao 
members the lowest. Catholics and Chinese religionists are in the middle and do not have 
significant differences in their educational attitudes. Qualitative interviews with 
knowledgeable Taiwanese informants strengthens these arguments and helps explain 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 TOPIC  
      The central goal of this study is to examine the impact of religion on gender 
equality in a non-Western society like Taiwan. Studies in the United States show that 
religion influences both attitudes toward and attainment of gender equality. Historically, 
some religious traditions have fostered changes toward modern gender ideologies and 
others resisted. Religion has helped produce and legitimize gender ideologies in the U.S. 
These studies suggest that fundamental religious traditions are more likely to embrace 
patriarchic family norms, which in turn reinforce gender inequality in family and society. 
However, most studies are limited to Judeo-Christian contexts. It is not clear whether 
these patterns apply to societies where other religious traditions have been dominant or 
where gender or family ideologies are different – for example in a Confucian society like 
Taiwan.  
     Taiwan is an ideal case for testing the association between religion and gender or 
family issues for the following reasons. First, Taiwan is a society of considerable religious 
diversity. As Taiwan has experienced dramatic economic growth and transitioned from an 
agricultural society to an economically advanced society during the past half century, it has 
also experienced religious vitality (Tamney and Chiang 2002). The majority of the 
population is religious: approximately 75 to 80 percent of the population report practicing 
various Chinese traditional religions (i.e., Buddhists, Taoists, and many folk religions), 
about five percent are Christian (Protestant and Catholic), about four percent practice new 
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religious movements, and only about ten percent report do not affiliate with any religion 
(Chiu 1997). Even among unaffiliated Taiwanese, many report attending various religious 
rituals, worshiping ancestors, or visiting fortune-tellers for important life events (Chiu 2006, 
Vermander S.J. 1997). Although Christianity is a minority religion in Taiwan, Christian 
Churches have played an important role in influencing Taiwan’s modern history. Churches 
were the main institutions to bring in international relief and aid, they helped build schools 
and hospitals, and advocated many civil and social welfare services in Taiwan; most 
important, they are considered a major agent in introducing western civilization to this 
society (Lin 1998, Guo 1999a).  
     Second, scholars argue that although the dramatic modernization process has brought 
challenges to Taiwanese family life, the patriarchal nature of family relations remains 
influential, and the traditional family cultures stay strong (e.g., Gallin 1982, Greenhalgh 
1985, Xu and Lai 2002). Although women’s participation in the labor force and enrollment 
in mandatory education have greatly increased, there is still significant inequality between 
men and women in earnings, educational attainment, and other areas of family life (Baraka 
1999). The dominant gender role division is still the traditional men-as-breadwinner, 
women-as-home-maker. More than half of women will eventually leave the labor market 
because of marriage or childbearing (Yi and Chien 1999).  
    Although demographers disagree about how family and gender role ideologies have 
changed, they agree that there are unexamined cultural factors that are independent from 
economic development and have sustaining effects on family and gender relations. In a 
traditional Chinese society such as Taiwan, religion is never really separable from family 
lives (Chiu 1986). Family order and institutions are often organized through kinship 
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systems, which are rooted in patrilineal relations. Such systems are closely entwined with 
religious rituals such as ancestor worship. However, whether and how religion is associated 
with gender equality or family relations remain unexamined. Although such traditional 
family structures can provide solidarity and order, they may create gender inequality at the 
same time. Women can be positioned at a disadvantage position in the relational hierarchy. 
    Third, during the past two decades, Taiwan has been the site of high quality survey 
data collection, including measures of religion and gender issues that are analogous to those 
in major U.S. surveys, but adapted to Chinese culture. This allows me to examine the 
religion-gender-family connection in a non-Western context. Unfortunately, there are 
almost no quantitative studies examining religious effects on family life in Chinese 
societies. There are established anthropological pieces, but most of them focus on single 
cases, or individual villages to examine the relationships between family systems and 
ancestor worship rituals within Chinese religious traditions. Even after good nationally 
representative data were collected, few scholars even addressed the association between 
religion and family and gender issues using those data. So far the only two studies I have 
found using survey data are the W. Grichting Value System in Taiwan in 1970 directly 
examining the association between religion and family and dating behaviors in Taiwan1; 
and the other one is conducted by Dr. Hei-yuan Chiu and colleagues, exploring the 
association between religion and family ideology in Taiwan (Chiu 1986). However, this 
research is limited in focus, out of date, and use less advanced sampling technique to select 
a large scale nationally representative sample.   
                                                 
1 For more information about this survey, please visit: www.icpsr.umich.edu 
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Thus, this study is the first empirical study examining the association between religion 
and gender and family issues in China or Taiwan using a nationally representative sample. It 
has policy relevance and will fill the gaps in both the western literature on religion and 
gender by providing comparisons with the situation in the non-western world, and in the 
Chinese literature by providing a broader statistical context for interpreting qualitative case 
studies. It can also provide a foundation for future large scale studies in mainland China.  
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND  
1.2.1 INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN TAIWAN    
Taiwan has transitioned from an agricultural society into a highly industrialized 
society, yet demographers disagree about how the changing social context affects family 
life in Taiwan. For example, Thornton and Lin (1994) argue that dramatic economic and 
educational expansion, increasing women’s participation in the labor force, and large 
scale urbanization and migration will change traditional family culture by reducing the 
authority of parents over children, causing diverging interests among family members, 
and bring divergence of interests into the family. Thus, the authority of the traditional 
family over individuals will diminish. Further, the influx of western media will “erode” 
traditional family life in Taiwan.  
    On the other hand, other scholars have forcefully critiqued these statements (e.g. 
Greenhalgh 1986, Xu and Lai 2002, Pas 2003). They point out that although Taiwan has 
gone through tremendous economic change, the fundamental patriarchic family culture 
stay strong. These scholars recognize that family life remains at the core of Chinese 
families, such as the belief and practice of marrying, universality of parenthood, large 
family kinship networks, caring for the elderly, and honoring one’s ancestors, etc. 
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Marriage and child bearing are highly emphasized, as they are not only related to the love 
between two people, but also link with the fulfillment of one’s filial piety to his family 
and their ancestors to continue the family lineage. For example, in the 1998 KAP survey, 
more than 70% of respondents believed it is important or very important to bear children 
to inherit family lines. However, some scholars do recognize the modest changing 
patterns within this overall stability, especially as people start to delay marriage (although 
most of them do marry), and reduce their fertility (Yi 2002).   
  However, many of these early works tend to be very descriptive (e.g. Thorton and 
Lin 1994) and do not demonstrate whether such trends are statistically significant. More 
important, although demographers disagree over how social transition changes family 
life, they do recognize the importance of cultural factors on family and gender relations. 
Religion might be one of the major cultural factors influencing family life and gender 
relations in traditional Chinese societies. As C.K. Yang stated, “the influence of religion 
on traditional Chinese family life was everywhere visible.” (P28, Yang 1967) Numerous 
other religious activities take place at one’s home instead of in public. From ancestor 
worship to family shrine rituals, religious practices not only function for supernatural 
meaning, for acquiring blessing and protection from the deities or the dead, they also help 
maintain family stability and harmony (Chiu 1986). Being filial to one’s ancestors is to 
assure the continuity of family life, and connect a mortal life with an immortal 
continuously passing family life via ancestor worship. That is why the family system is 
so important, because it is the core carrier of your immortal existence. It creates the 
possibility to exist through eternity. And in reality, most family rituals and gatherings are 
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centered around ancestor worship activities in Taiwan (Chiu 2006). Thus, it also links the 
dead with the living through family lines.     
1.2.2 Traditional Religions in Taiwan  
 
In order to understand the influence of religion in Chinese societies, we need to 
understand some of the unique characters of Chinese religions. First, numerous studies 
depict the religious beliefs and practices in Chinese societies are polytheistic. People pray 
to various gods, spirits, or deities at the same time. Not only are deities not exclusive, 
they often function in different complementary roles. For example, some deities are 
believed to help people pass exams and receive academic achievements (文曲星), some 
specialize in granting health (藥神)，some are good at helping people find a good mate (
月老), some in granting fertility and sons (e.g. 文生娘娘), and others protect local 
communities (e.g., 土地公), or just give general blessings (e.g., 關公, 媽祖). As people 
often worship various deities with similar functions, the “efficacy” of deities is 
emphasized (Yang 1967, Chiu 1990). If one deity is not efficient in granting prayers, 
worshippers may abandon them and switch to other gods. Both lay worshippers and most 
folk temples do not discriminate between deities; temples offer various rituals and 
services so that they can accommodate the needs of worshippers. For example, in many 
Taiwanese Buddhist temples, Taoist and folk deities are often present and Shou-Jing (収
驚)，An-Tai-Sui (安太歲), or fortune-telling (算命) are also available on site. Such 
polytheistic beliefs and practices are consistently reflected in national surveys, such as in 
the 1970 Grichting religion survey (Grichting 1971) and Chiu’s 20 years of Taiwan 
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Social Change Survey research (Chiu 2006).   
    Second, religions in Chinese societies tend to be diffused rather than institutional. In 
contrast with religions in the West, where an organized religious system or community is 
emphasized, religions in Chinese societies do not require regular attendance at a fixed 
religious institution, or building up a regular network among fellow worshippers or with 
the priesthood (Yang 1967, Chiu 1990). People often go to temples to pray only in times 
of need or on holidays. When visiting temples, worshippers do not need to register to 
become a member, or talk to fellow worshipers; they offer incense, casting lots (剝柸), or 
light sacrificial oil on their own. In small or rural temples, there is often no priest, the 
only contact between the priest and the worshippers is generally when worshippers offer 
payment after a priest to perform a special ritual for them (Tamney and Lai 2002). Thus, 
traditional Chinese traditional religions do not foster close relational networks between 
believers and religious leaders.  
    Third, Chinese traditional religions tend to have strong pragmatic and utilitarian 
tendencies (Yang 1967, Chiu 1990). The key function of beliefs and practices tends to be 
this-world oriented, focusing on winning favor and protection for this world matters 
(Tamney and Chiang 2002). The salvation of souls is not a central theme for most people; 
life-after-death issues tend to be vague. For example, in Grichting’s 1970s Taiwan 
religion survey, respondents were asked: “What do you feel will probably happen to you 
after you die? Do you feel you will (a) go to heaven, (b) go to hell, (c) be reborn, or (d) 
stop existing?” More than 65% of folk or traditional religionists chose the answer “stop 
existing” (Grichting 1971). Because most people speculate they will stop existing after 
they die, the role of religion assuring and protecting the wellbeing of this-world matters 
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will becomes more important. The rise of materialism and commercialism in Taiwan may 
further give pragmatic folk religions a boost (Chiu 1990).  
Fourth, Chinese traditional religions do not tend to carry ethical connotations (Yang 
1967). The rising popularity of You-Ying-Gong temples (有應公) illustrates this. You-
Ying-Gong (YYG) literally means whatever-you-pray-will-be-granted. The deities of 
YYG are lonely or wondering spirits who died from war or disease and have no offspring 
to worship them or cannot be recognized by people, but they are believed to have special 
efficacy (Chiu 2006). As long as you give them offerings, they will use their power to 
help you. It has become one of the most popular deities for gamblers or robbers, as those 
spirits do not care whether your prayers are morally wrong or not (Chiu 2006).  
However, regarding the ethical issues of Chinese religion, there is one exception—
Yi Guan Dao. Yi Guan Dao can be roughly translated as “the Way of One Path”, or “the 
Way of One Unity”. Yi-Guan-Dao (YGD) – sometimes written as I-Kuan-Tao – 
originally developed in China in late 19th century, and was brought to Taiwan in 1946 
when many Mainland Chinese fled to Taiwan with the KMT party (Lin 1994). YGD 
worships a high God called Ming-Ming Shang-Di (明明上帝) and a Mother Goddess 
named Wu-Sheng Lao-Mu (無生老母). Their doctrine combines Chinese traditional folk 
beliefs with teachings from various major world religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, 
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Islam (Lin 1994).  
Compared with other Chinese traditional religions, YGD has several distinctive 
characters. First, it has apocalyptic beliefs about the “end times and the three stages 
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before that”（三期末劫)2. Second, YGD emphasizes that the salvation of the soul is not 
based on the accumulation of merit, but on becoming an YGD member and a disciple of 
their divinely ordained masters (Lin 1994, Qin and Ai 2000). Third, YGD emphasizes 
strict vegetarian practices. It is estimated that about half of Taiwan’s vegetarian 
restaurants are run by Yi-Guan-Dao members (Taiwan yearbook 2004).   
Fourth, YGD strongly emphasizes studying Confucianism and Taoism classics (Lin 
1994). They provide many Chinese study classes (國學班), organize youth campus, and 
have attracted many young and educated members to their classes and temples.3 Not 
only do they emphasize studying and reciting classics, they also emphasize Orthodox 
Confucianism morality such as filial piety, honesty, chastity, faithfulness, etc. These 
moral principles are often connected with members’ spiritual rewards (Lin 1994). For 
example, if a member converts more than 64 people to YGD, this person will assure his 
or her parents and ancestors will be saved eternally (Song 1983a). This religion-morality 
connection may influence YGD members’ family ideology.   
Fifth, YGD has a very different organizational structure than other Chinese 
traditional religions. Members worship at a temple, but also have intensive gatherings at 
member’s homes (Lin 1994). Historically, they often gather at night (Lin 1994, Song 
1983a), and are often considered secretive (Lin 1994, Song 1983a, Qin and Ai 2000).  
Their highly organized religious system, intense proselytizism, secrecy, and end times 
messages may have increased the KMT government’s suspicion of them. Thus YGD was 





banned as an “evil cult” until 1987 (Chiu 2006, Lin 1994). It is also banned in Mainland 
China, and is heatedly criticized by orthodox Chinese Buddhists (Chiu 2006). However, 
decades of restriction and regulation have not limited its growth; it has become one of the 
largest religious groups in Taiwan, and one of the fastest growing (Lin 1994).  
1.2.3 Christianity and Social Change in Taiwan  
 
In the west, Christianity is often the dominant religious culture. In Taiwan 
Christianity is a minority religion. Although Christianity has rapidly grown since the 
1950s-especially the evangelical denominations-Christians still make up less than five 
percent of Taiwanese population. Christian churches have played a unique and influential 
role in influencing Taiwan modern society, especially politically and socially.   
    Christian missionaries initiated and promoted modern education and medical work 
in Taiwan (Lin 1996; Lin 2003). Christian churches also become the major sources of 
foreign relief and aid to Taiwan (Lin 1998). Churches devoted vast resources to social 
welfare work and health care. They also influenced Taiwan’s political democratization 
process. The Taiwan Presbyterian Church has been a major force fighting against the 
political corruption of the KMT party, fighting against injustice toward aboriginal 
mountain people, and promoted Taiwan’s independence and selfhood internationally 
(Rubinstein 2003, Tamney and Chiang 2002, Hunter and Chan 1993). Christian churches 
have also been a major cultural agent bringing in western civilization in Taiwan (Guo 
1999a). 
    Taiwanese Christians also have distinct demographic characters. They are much 
more highly educated than the average population (Tamney and Chiang 2002, Chao 
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2004). About 6% of Taiwanese are enrolled in higher education, but about 40% of 
Taiwanese Christians are (Grichting 1971). Christians are also disproportionately 
government workers, white-collar professionals, military officers, and college students. 
Their minority status but high accumulation of social capital have put them in a position 
like the Jews in the U.S.  
 Furthermore, unlike the world orientation of most Chinese traditional religions, 
Protestants especially conservative evangelical ones in Taiwan emphasize confession, 
salvation, and eternal life (Chao 2004). Taiwanese Protestants often strongly oppose 
ancestor worship practices. These teachings and traditions have made Protestants in 
Taiwan show distinct characters regarding family life in Taiwan. 
   Similar to Protestantism, Catholicism has also been an important cultural agent for 
spreading western civilization in Taiwan (Guo 1999a). However, different from the 
theoretically generally conservative Protestantism, Catholics in Taiwan tend to be very 
theologically liberal (Guo 1999b, Chao 2004). According to Guo Wenban (1999b), 
among the “Western” religions, Catholicism has the highest contexualization with 
Chinese societies. Catholics have greater tolerance for ancestor worship, and since the 
1970s, Catholics have had several movements promoting Chinese culture into Catholic 
religious practices, for example designing church buildings in Chinese style, clergy 
wearing ancient Chinese-style clothing, and drawing on Chinese philosophical concepts 
in theological teachings. By doing so, catholic churches emphasize the connection 
between “Catholic beliefs” with “Chinese traditional culture.” However, because of most 
of those movements were top-down rather than grass-root movements, most laity do not 
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have similar attitudes. Catholicism is still related to “foreignness.”  
1.2.4 RESEARCH QUESTION  
The central question of this dissertation is whether and how religion influence 
gender and family relations in Taiwan. Are certain religions more likely to promote 
gender equality? How do Chinese traditional religions and Christian religions differ on 
these issues? Which aspects of gender and family relations are more or less likely to be 
affected by religious backgrounds and beliefs?     
  In order to explore those questions, I focus on three gender issues. Chapter 2 focuses 
on religious variations in gender role ideologies within marriage. Chapter 3 explores the 
association between religion and educational aspiration for children. And Chapter 4 
examines how religion affects women’s attitudes toward fertility issues especially 
abortion. Although these are independent chapters, together they explore whether and 
how religion affects gender relations in a Chinese society.  
 1.3 METHODOLOGY  
1.3.1 Taiwan Social Change Survey and KAP  
 
   My primary data come from two national representative Taiwanese data sets: 
The Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) and The Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice 
of Contraception among Married Women in Taiwan (KAP). Both of these are replicated 
cross-sectional surveys.  
     The TSCS tries to depict the long-term impact of social change on society. Since 
1985, it has been conducted almost annually, and each year is a nation-wide probability 
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sample of about 1,900 adults between 20 to 75 years old. With more than 80,000 
interviews completed over the past 22 years, the TSCS has become the largest survey 
series among all of the general social surveys in the world (Chiu 2006 presentation). The 
TSCS is based at the Academia Sinica, R.O.C., jointly operated by the Institute of 
Sociology and the Center for Survey Research of Taiwan. Analogous to the U.S. General 
Social Survey (GSS), TSCS covers a wide range of topics such as family, education, 
religion, occupation, political participation, etc. In the religion modules, it asks about 
denominations and frequency of service attendance, as well as unique measures about 
multiple aspects of the Chinese religious contexts, such as folk religion practices, beliefs 
about afterlife and spirits, ancestor worship, etc. It contains series of measures about 
respondent’s attitude on household division of labor, decision making within marriage, 
and definition of womanhood. It allows me to assess religious effects on gender roles and 
family issues at multiple levels. In this study, I use the 1990, 2000, 2002, and 2002-
family modules. 
      In order to further examine religious association with gender role attitudes and 
abortion, I also use data from KAP. KAP was conducted by the Taiwan Institute of 
Family Planning, and provided by the Bureau of Health Promotion, Department of Health, 
R.O.C. Analogous to the National Survey of Family Growth in the U.S.; KAP is a 
representative sample of married women aged 20-49 in Taiwan. The average sample size 
is 3,500 each year. It covers rich information on pregnancy history, family planning and 
contraception use, actual and desired number and sex of children, gender role attitudes, 
marriage history, women’s working history and working attitudes, religious beliefs and 
practices, family background, etc. KAP provide incredible measures on history of and 
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motivations for abortion and attitudes toward son preference. It is the most 
comprehensive data sources on fertility and marriage in Taiwan. It enables me to examine 
the impact of religious tradition plus other measures of religious practices in Taiwan, 
such as ancestor worship, Feng-Shui, etc. With the help of Professor Wei-hsin Yu from 
University of Texas at Austin, I have obtained the KAP 1998 data from the Taiwan 
Institute of Family Planning. It enables me to test the impact of religious traditions on 
abortion and gender issues in Taiwan.  
1.3.2 Field Interviews in Taipei, Taiwan 
 
Although the data are very rich, they have some limitations. For example, the 
detailed religious modules are separate from the family or education modules. Thus, in 
my analysis I can only use very basic religion questions such as affiliation, level of 
devotedness etc. KAP and TSCS cannot provide information on how and why 
respondents have certain attitudes. In addition, in many of my models the N of Christians 
and new religion movements are very small. Thus, in order to further examine my 
quantitative results and better understand religious variations on gender issues, I also 
gathered first-hand qualitative data. In the summer of 2007, with the help of Fichter 
Research Grant from the Association for the Sociology of Religion and the Jack Shand 
Research Grant from the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, I went to Taiwan 
and conducted in-depth interviews, and visited various religious groups. I have 
interviewed both religious authorities (e.g., Christian pastors, priests, Buddhist master or 
Abbots) and lay members from various background. 
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     I interviewed 22 people in Taipei district (including Taipei city and Taipei county), 
Taiwan. Among them were four Buddhists --two masters and two lay members, three folk 
religion practioners, one YGD teacher/elder, seven Catholic—one priest, one nun, five 
lay members, seven Protestants—two pastors (one PCT, one Fundamental), and five lay 
members . Among those seven Protestants were two from the Presbyterian church 
(mainline), one from a very large charismatic church, three from small fundamental 
evangelical church, one from the True-Jesus-Church (aboriginal group, a fast growing 





















Utilizing a large scale nationally representative survey (KAP) and in-depth interviews, 
this study examines the association between religion and gender role attitudes in Taiwan. 
My findings show that members of conservative religious groups such as Taiwan 
Protestants and the new religious movement Yi-Guan-Dao are more likely to view 
women’s work as having a negative impact on family life and more likely to support 
traditional men-as-breadwinner, women-as-home-maker gender roles. On the other hand, 
Catholics and secular groups tend to hold more liberal views of gender roles, especially 
regarding men’s participation in the house and financial contribution from both genders.  

















2.2 INTRODUCTION  
 
     During the past three decades, Taiwan has transformed from an agricultural society 
to one of the most developed societies in East Asia. Modernization has dramatically 
increased women’s participation in the labor force and enrollment in mandatory education. 
However, scholars also noted that the patriarchic nature of gender relations stay strong 
(Gallin 1982, Yu 2001, Xu and Lai 2002). The dominant household division of labor is 
still traditional, with the form of men-as-breadwinner and women-as-homemaker. More 
than half of women who have work experience before marriage will leave the labor force 
because of childbirth or family obligations (Yi and Chien 1999). The increased acceptance 
and participation in work outside of the home does not bring a more egalitarian gender role 
ideology (Yu 2001). Demographers and family scholars have paid substantial attention to 
this issue, and they suggest there may be cultural factors that help sustain these traditional 
gender role ideologies (Yi 2002). Yet they have not studied what these cultural factors are. 
Chinese traditional culture and religion are so intimately connected. How much does 
religion influence gender role attitudes? Are certain religious traditions more likely to 
encourage traditional patriarchic relations, while others promote more egalitarian views?   
      Studies in the United States show that religion influences both attitudes toward and 
attainment of gender equality. Religion has been an important force in producing and 
legitimizing family ideology in the U.S. (e.g., Wilcox 2004). These studies suggest that 
fundamental religious traditions are more likely to embrace patriarchic family norms, 
which in turn reinforces gender inequality in family and society. However, most studies 
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are limited to Judeo-Christian contexts. It is not clear whether these patterns can apply to 
societies where other religious traditions have been dominant or where gender or family 
ideologies are different – for example in a Confucian Asian society like Taiwan.  
    Taiwan is an ideal case for examining the association between religion and gender 
relations in a changing society. Taiwan has gone through tremendous modernization and 
urbanization during the past half century, and the religious market is also thriving. Although 
ritual-oriented Chinese traditional religions rarely produce moral ethics from their doctrines, 
they have reinforced traditional Chinese Confucianism orthodoxy (Yang 1967, Chiu 2006). 
Not only so, Taiwanese Protestant and Catholic churches have also played an important role 
in modern Taiwan history, and showed distinct characteristics in the area of family, 
sexuality, political participation, and ethnic relations (Chiu 1986; Huang 1996; Rubinstein 
1991). Understanding whether different religions affect gender role ideologies and why will 
help scholars understand the association between religion and gender and family life more 
broadly. 
     Thus, it raises a number of interesting and unexamined questions. For example: How 
do Chinese religious groups vary in their support or resistance to Chinese traditional 
gender ideologies? Are Christians in Taiwan more likely to endorse patriarchal beliefs like 
Conservative Protestants in the U.S. are, or are they more likely to endorse egalitarian 
roles associated with “Western civilization” and “progress”? W hat aspects of gender role 
ideology are more likely to be stressed by certain groups? In this study, I will use 




2.3 BACKGROUND  
 
2.3.1 TRADITIONAL IDEOLOGY AND RELIGION IN TAIWAN 
      Chinese societies have emphasized the traditional “men as breadwinner women as 
homemaker” gender ideologies throughout history (男主外- 女主內). This ideology 
implies several aspects: first, men’s primary responsibility is to earn money and women’s 
job is to take care of the family; traditionally, a woman is expected to devote her life to her 
family, and married women are discouraged from working outside of the home except for 
working in family businesses. Second, the household division of labor tends to be gender-
oriented. There are men’s jobs and women’s jobs within the household. The stereotype of 
a Confucian gentleman is a “respectful,” strict, but distant man. Men are typically not to be 
expected to participate much in housework chores such as cooking, doing laundry, 
cleaning, spend time playing or rearing children. Those tasks are considered as “women’s 
work.” Thus, a traditional-minded man may feel ashamed to do these chores. The more 
traditional the household is, the more likely they will have this gendered division of labor. 
Third, as the traditional family system is organized through patriarchic kinship systems, 
fathers, elder brothers, and husbands tend to have higher authority in the family hierarchy 
than women do.    
In the traditional Chinese societies religion is not separable from family lives (Chiu, 
1986, Yang 1967). For example, patriarchic family systems are closely entwined with the 
rituals and ceremonies of ancestor worship. Ancestor worship is not only a ritual, but also 
tightly related to filial piety. It is also related to the idea of honoring one’s family, 
respecting seniority, and continuing the family lineage (Yang 1967). Chinese traditional 
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religionists tend to have pressure to have children, especially more sons. Marriage and 
fertility are important in fulfilling family’s needs for religion and continuity of tradition.    
Moreover, Confucianism orthodoxy is often emphasized by Chinese traditional 
religions (Chiu 1989). Many Chinese traditional religions focus on performing rituals, and 
either folk religions do not have formal doctrines or the doctrines do not have ethical 
connotations (Yang 1967). Because of this, they tend to rely heavily on Confucianism as 
their ethical orthodoxy. In such contexts, Confucian ideas of submission and filial piety are 
often emphasized (Wang 1997). Thus, Chinese religions can legitimize and reinforce the 
traditional Confucianism through the moral frame of family solidarity.  
The emphasis on Confucian orthodoxy is even stronger in some new religious 
movement groups such as Yi-Guan-Dao (YGD). Although YGD was only legalized in 
Taiwan about twenty years ago and is still a quasi-secretive religion, it has one of the 
fastest growth rates of any religious group in Taiwan (Lin 1994). It emphasizes 
traditional family morals such as chastity of women, filial piety to parents, loyalty and 
faithfulness to one’s family, etc., to fight against the “decaying of modern secular 
culture.” Most importantly, they emphasize patriarchal relations in both their religious 
orders and family life (http://www.fecd.org.tw/index2.htm).   
For example, one of the 18 highest YGD masters, Ms Hong-ling Chen of the Chong-
De lineage, a highly respected, 92-year-old, YGD leader, addressed gender role issues at 
the World Conference of Women Religious and Spiritual Leaders 
(http://www.fecd.org.tw/index2.htm). Regarding the family relationship, Ms Chen said:  
According to our tradition, men are in charge of the public sphere while 
women, private. They have separate responsibilities and they respect each 
accordingly…. Men have always been leaders while women, followers. 
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Since our tradition is in keeping with our natural tendencies, we should 
follow the good tradition passed down from ancient times….This is the 
power of morality.…On the contrary, it violates female virtue for a woman 
to quarrel with her husband constantly…. 
 
It seems that YGD leaders not only emphasize traditional Confucian gender roles, but 
also advocate them in order to promote family morality. Even when addressing 
women’s roles in religious organizations, Ms Chen still emphasizes the priority of a 
woman’s family over temple services, as she said:  
If you are a female leader (in temple), you should show a little moderation, 
especially when dealing with male colleagues…Do not be authoritative 
and do not adhere to your own stance on matters…In Yi-Guan-Dao, a 
female can be a leader, a Transmitting Master or a Lecturer. However, a 
married female should focus on promoting family harmony. Since I am 
unwed and have contributed all my energy into Dao, it will not interfere 
with my family. 
 
Because of this, I expect that YGD members will display more traditional gender 
roles than other religionists.  
2.3.2 Christianity and Gender Relations in Taiwan     
 
Studies conducted in the U.S. suggest that fundamentalist religious traditions, 
particularly Conservative Protestantism, produce and legitimize conservative gender 
ideologies. For example, Conservative Protestants are more likely to emphasize men’s 
headship in the household, to defend traditional family roles, and to resist “modern” 
egalitarian family ideologies than other religious groups (Bendroth 1993, Ellison and 
Bartkowski 2002, Glass and Jacobs 2005, Lehrer 1999, Sherkat 2000). They tend to 
encourage women to marry earlier, have more children, and be homemakers, and they are 
more likely to discourage women from working outside the home – especially when 
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children are young( Glass and Jacobs 2005). Such gender roles are often sacralized because 
the relations between men and women represents the relationship between Jesus and the 
church (Focus on the Family website).  
Compared to conservative Protestants, U.S. Catholics and mainline Protestants 
typically hold more liberal family ideologies. Catholics often have ambiguous family 
ideologies and thus are less alarmed by the surrounding secular culture “eroding” family 
morality (Wilcox 2004; Wilcox, Chaves, and Franz 2004). Instead of setting boundaries 
around traditional family life, mainline Protestants and Catholics focus more on the “golden 
rules,” social justice and the impact of socio-economic factors on the family instead of 
conservative theology about gender and sexuality (Wilcox 2004; Wilcox, Chaves, and Franz 
2004).  
Christians in Taiwan have distinct attitudes toward family relations, sexuality, 
parenting, and even politics (Chiu 2006). I have two competing hypotheses about the 
association between Christianity and gender roles in Taiwan. One the one hand, the majority 
of Taiwanese Protestants have conservative evangelical theology (Chao 2004), thus similar 
to U.S. conservative Protestants I expect Taiwan Protestants to have more conservative 
gender role ideologies than other groups.  
On the other hand, Christian churches are viewed as one of the major agents bringing 
western civilizations to Taiwan (Guo 1999a). This is especially true of the Taiwan 
Presbyterian Church (TPC). They have been one of the most active advocates of political 
reform, democracy, anti-corruption, and human rights for indigenous groups and women 
compared with other religious groups ( Lin 1994). Catholics may also be more socially 
liberal than Protestants in Taiwan. For example, where as Protestants actively oppose 
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participation on folk religious rituals and ancestor worship, and at most are highly selective 
in which aspects of Confucianism they appropriate (Jiang 1996; 2004, 
http://www.forerunner.cc); the Catholic Church in Taiwan has emphasized localization of 
Christianity into Chinese culture for decades (Guo 1999b). For example, they hold national 
ancestor benediction ceremonies to ease tension between Christianity and Chinese folk 
beliefs. This focus on tolerance and integration was further confirmed in my interviews with 
two Catholic priests in Taiwan. Father Wu mentioned that the current slogan for the Taiwan 
Catholic Church is “there goes everyone.” They often emphasize the similarity of Catholic 
faith with other religions, organize charity or community work together with people from 
other faiths, and focus on social justice and humanitarian issues rather than theological 
issues (Interview notes 2007). The majority of Taiwanese Catholic laity is very also liberal 
(Guo 1999b, Chao 2004). Most Taiwanese Catholics are baptized at birth and typically have 
a very loose connection with the Church after that. According to Dr. Guo Wenban, the 
leading expert on Catholicism in Taiwan, about 75% of self-proclaimed Catholics rarely 
attend church throughout their adult life; among those who attend about half only attend on 
religious holidays.  
Because of these reasons, I have another competing hypothesis, that Taiwan 
Christians (especially mainline Protestants and Catholics) will have less traditional 
gender role ideologies compared with other traditional religious groups. 
2.4 DATA 
      The primary data come from two nationally representative Taiwanese data sets: 
The Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS). TSCS is a replicated cross-sectional survey. 
TSCS was conducted by the Academia Sinica, R.O.C. almost annually from 1984. It is a 
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nation-wide probability sample of about 1,900 adults between 20 to 75 years old. 
Analogous to the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS), TSCS covers a wide range of topics 
such as family, education, religion, occupation, political participation, etc. In the religion 
modules, it asks about denominations and frequency of service attendance, as well as 
unique measures about multiple aspects of Chinese religious contexts, such as folk 
religion practices, beliefs about afterlife and spirits, ancestor worship, etc. It also covers 
family and spousal religious backgrounds and community religious practices. It contains 
a series of measures about respondents’ attitude about household division, decision- 
making within marriage, and definition of womanhood. It will allow me to assess the 
religious effects on gender role attitudes and ideologies on multiple levels. After listwise 
deletion, the final sample is 1795. 
      In addition to quantitative survey research, I also conducted twenty two in-depth 
interviews in Taipei, Taiwan with my knowledgeable informants. My twenty two 
interviewees come from various religious and social backgrounds. With the generous 
help and counsel of Dr. Hei-yuan Chiu and other scholars in Taiwan, I constructed a 
sample of 30 people based on religion, gender, residence, ethnicity, education and social 
background. My final achieved sample included twenty two interviews, including both 
clergies and lay worshippers from all the major religious groups I studied in the 
quantitative research. There were four Buddhists, including one master, one abbot, and 
two devoted lay Buddhists; three folk religion practioners, one is an accountant in a folk 
temple, one a Taxi driver, and one runs a computer shop; there was one new religious 
movement (YGD) teacher; seven Catholics, including one priest, one nun, and five lay 
members from various social backgrounds; and there are seven Protestants from various 
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denominations with two pastors and five lay Protestants. My qualitative discussions are 
mainly based on these interviews.   
2.5 MEASURES 
GENDER ROLE ATTITUDES  
     In 2002 TSCS, there are a set of questions about gender role attitudes. Respondents 
are asked the level of (dis)agreement with the following statements: (1) “Mothers that have 
full time jobs will bring harm to pre-school children;” (2) “Generally speaking, a wife’s 
full time career will interfere with her family life;” (3) “It will not be a bad thing for 
women to have a career, but what women really want is to have family and children;” (4) 
“Men’s job is to earn money, and women’s job is to take care of family;” (5) “Both men 
and women should contribute financially to the household;” (6) “Compared with how 
much housework men do now, they should do more;” and (7) “Compared with the current 
share on child rearing, men should do more.” These questions provide a more 
comprehensive view to measure different dimensions of gender role attitudes. Item (1) to 
(3) refer to the views regarding people’s attitudes toward women work outside of home; 
items (4) and (5) measure attitudes toward division of household labor; and items (6) and 
(7) access respondent’s views on men’s participation in family life. Egalitarianism relates 
not only rely to the acceptance of non-traditional gender roles of women, but also revealed 
in the attitudes toward men’s participation in domestic life (Wilcox 2004). Items are coded 
so that the higher value the more likely the respondent agrees with the statement.  4  
                                                 
4 In exploratory analyses, I tested whether all seven items could be combined into a single scale. However, 
the alpha was only .48, which is too low to be used as a reliable scale. I also tested whether the variables in 
each table could be combined into three distinct scales. However, the variables for the first two groups did 
not have sufficiently high alphas (.43 and .02 respectively).  
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RELIGIOUS MEASURES 
       One of the limitations of survey research, including this study, is a lack of 
effective measures for Chinese religions. Although TSCS has very rich religion questions 
in the religion modules, in the family and cultural modules I use for this chapter it only 
has basic religious measures such as religious affiliation and “devoutness.” It cannot fully 
capture the complexity of Chinese religious phenomena. However, this is still the first 
empirical study examining the association between religion and family and gender issues 
in Taiwan. It will hopefully inspire extensive data collection in the future. 
      Because of the polytheistic nature of Chinese religions, scholars tend to treat 
various folk religions under one category “Chinese traditional religion”, which include 
Taoists, Buddhists, and various folk religion practices. Moreover, in order to empirically 
test whether there are actual differences on attitudes of gender among those groups, I 
created separate categories for Buddhists, Taoists, and folk religionists. The results show 
that these three groups are very similar to each other. All differences are minor and not 
statistically significant. Thus, in the final model, I created a combined religious category 
“Chinese traditional religions” including respondents from the three traditions. In 
addition to the Chinese traditional religion group, I included Catholics, Protestants, YGD, 
and non-religious categories. In this paper, the traditional religionist group is the 
reference category. However, in supplementary analyses I compare each religious group 
by pair and use each group in turn as the reference group, in order to examine religious 
variations among those groups, instead only comparing with traditional religionists. I 
discuss significant differences I found in these supplementary analyses in the text. In 
order to save space, I did not include these models in the final paper. But they are 
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available upon request.   
OTHER BACKGROUND VARIABLES  
      Although there is little study about religious effects on gender role ideology in 
Taiwan, family researchers or demographers have given attention to the impact of other 
socio-demographic factors on gender role ideology in Chinese contexts (Thortin and Lin 
1994; Xu and Lai 2002; Yi 2002; Yu 2006). In order to take these factors into account, I 
controlled respondent’s age (measured in years), sex(1=male, 0=female), region 
(1=Metropolitan cities, 0=other regions), marital status (1=married, 0=single), presence 
of children(1=have one or more children, 0=otherwise), ethnicity (Minnan-reference 
group, Hakka, Mainlander, and Aboriginal), education (measured in years), and 
household income. 5   
2.6 RESULTS   
 [Table 2.1 about here] 6 
Table 2.1 shows odds ratio results from ordered logistic regression models predicting 
attitudes toward women’s work outside of home by religion. There are three dependent 
variables: (1) “women’s full time work is bad for preschool children,” (2) “women’s full 
time work will harm her family life,” and (3) “it is OK for women to work outside of home, 
but what women really want is to have family and children.” For each variable I include a 
base model with only the religion variables (M1) in it and a full model with other controls 
(M2).   
                                                 
5 There are 106 missing cases produced by the income measure. In order to save sample size, I impute 
mean score for these cases. 
 
6 For the descriptive statistics table, please refer to Appendix B.  
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After controlling all other factors, only non-religious respondents are significantly 
less likely to think that mother’s full time work will bring bad influence on small children, 
compared with traditional religionists (OR=.729, p<.01). As for the influence of women’s 
work on family life, Protestants are more likely to believe women’s full time work will 
harm family life, compared with traditional religionists (OR=1.266, p<.05). In my 
supplementary analyses there were significant differences between any other religious 
groups regard this issue: Protestants are also significantly more likely to agree on this 
negative view regard women’s full time work than Catholics, YGD, and non-religious 
respondents. Finally, regarding the statement, “it is OK for women to work, but what 
women really want is to have family and children,” Catholics and non-religious respondents 
are less likely to agree with this traditional statement compared with traditional religionists 
(OR=.404, p<.01 and OR=.791, p<.05 respectively); while Taiwanese Protestants are 
significantly more likely to agree on this issue than Catholics with other factors controlled.  
       In summary, Taiwanese Catholics and non-religious respondents tend to display 
less traditional views of women’s employment than traditional religionists; however, 
Protestants seem to show more traditional views than traditional religionists and other 
groups, particularly Catholics and non-religionists.   
[Table 2.2 about here]  
Table 2.2 shows the odds ratios from ordered logistic regression models predicting 
attitudes toward household division of labor by religion. It includes two items, attitudes 
toward the statement “men’s primary job is to earn money and women’s primary job is to 
take care of the family” and “both men and women should contribute to the household 
financially.” This second item is special because no study has examined the impact of 
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religion on attitudes toward financial division of household in such a context. According to 
the results, similar to Table 1, non-religious respondents are significantly less likely to 
support the traditional men-as-breadwinner women-as-home-maker division of labor, 
compared with the traditional religionists (OR=.803, p<.05). YGD respondents have 
modestly more traditional views than traditional religionists (OR=1.768, p<.10); according 
to my supplementary analyses, YGD respondents also have more traditional views 
regarding this issue than Protestants and non-religious respondents.  
Interestingly, regarding gendered financial contribution to the household, Taiwanese 
Catholics and Protestants show very different views as Catholics are significantly more 
likely to agree that both men and women should contribute to family finance compared with 
traditional religionists (OR=1.977, p< .05), while Protestants are more likely to disagree 
with this statement compared with the traditional religionists (OR=.560, p< .05). My 
supplementary analyses also show that Catholics are also significantly more likely to 
support this view than non-religious respondents (OR=2.36, p<.05), YGD members 
(OR=2.38, p<.10), and Protestants (OR=3.65, p<.01). On the other hand, Protestants are less 
likely to favor women’s financial contribution compared with others.  
[Table 2.3 about here]  
The last table (Table 2.3) displays the odds ratios from ordered logistic regression 
models predicting men’s participation in the housework by religion. Consistent with other 
tables, after controlling other socio-demographic factors, Catholics are more likely than 
traditional religionists to think men should do more housework and spend more time on 
child rearing (OR=2.501, p<.05 and OR=3.179, p<.01 respectively); demonstrated by my 
supplementary analyses, Catholics are also significantly more likely to advocate greater 
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domestic work for men than Protestants, YGD members, and non-religious respondents 
(e.g., for item 6, OR=2.63, p<.01, OR=3.81, p<.01, and OR=2.91, p<.01 respectively). In 
other words, Taiwanese Catholics have the least traditional views regarding men’s 
participation of housework.  
   The control variables also reveal interesting results. For example, education is 
negatively associated with traditional gender role attitudes, people who have more 
education are significantly less likely to think women’s full time work outside the home 
will bring harm to family life or be bad for kids, and people who have higher education 
are more likely to support men’s participation in housework and childrearing. Similarly, 
people who live in metropolitan areas are significantly less likely to hold traditional 
views compared with people who live in the rural areas. 
2.7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION  
 
       Consistent with studies in the U.S. (Glass 2000, Sherkat 2000) , conservative 
religious groups such as Taiwanese Protestants and Yi-Guan-Dao members are more 
likely to hold traditional gender ideologies compared with other groups; Taiwanese 
Catholics and secular people tend to have the least traditional gender role ideologies. 
Contra my hypothesis, traditional religionists did not necessarily have more traditional 
views regarding gender roles. Especially on the issues regarding the negative influence of 
women’s work on family and division of labor over finances, Taiwanese Protestants are 
more likely to hold traditional views; regarding traditional men-as-breadwinner and 
women-as-homemaker gender roles, YGD are the most likely to support on this attitudes 
than others; on the other hand, regarding financial contrition and men’s participation in 
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housework, Catholics show the least traditional views compared with other groups.  
    These findings are further supported by my field interviews. For example, Miss Li, 
from the Church of Revival, a small fundamentalist/evangelical church in Taipei, said 
“the traditional men as breadwinner women as homemaker division is the ideal division 
of labor.” Li, a 30-year-old single woman working in a well-paid position for an import 
company, added that, “If one day I get married, I would like to stay at home and take care 
of my family.” When I asked her why she would like to make this choice, she explained, 
“People should educate their children with biblical principles from a very young age… A 
mother plays a very important role in educating her child…I really want to be a good 
mother and wife.” In my interview with the new pastor of this church, Mr. Chang, he 
mentioned that: 
If both husband and wife work, it will bring very negative influences, 
for example, the parents might not be able to build up a close 
relationship with their children. You will not be able to educate your 
children but let the world educate them. Plus, in current Taiwan, day 
care is very expensive, which almost cost a person’s full time salary. So 
if both work, you do not gain much, but lose a lot.  
 
These are demonstrations of how conservative Protestantism emphasizes familism 
and women’s role in educating children. This is consistent with the quantitative findings 
that Protestants are more likely to view women’s full time work will bring harm to her 
family life and discourage both men and women contribute to household financially.  
       Similar to the conservative Protestants, the YGD teacher emphasized traditional 
gender views. Teacher Bai, in her late thirties and works part time in a family business, 
described the YGD temple’s emphasis on “traditional gender relations.” As YGD temples 
often stress patriarchic Confucianism orthodoxy, Ms. Bai acknowledged that in her 
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temple, men have higher status than women. For example, women are not allowed to hold 
any of the important temple positions for public ceremony; instead, women are expected 
to do the “backstage service jobs” or the “helping work” (interview notes).  The temple 
also teaches members that “men’s position and authority should be honored at 
home…maintaining this order is to maintaining traditional virtue.”  
However, the devout Buddhist woman Ms. Wang, a homemaker and a mother of 
two children, seems to have very traditional views on gender relations too. When I 
asked her opinion on household division of labor, she answered: “Well, my marriage is 
difficult… My husband is very patriarchic and authoritarian. He came from a very 
traditional family. He does not do any housework. He comes back home from work, 
feeling tired, and just sits there having dinner or watching TV. If I ask him to do 
housework, he will get very upset.” She further told me: “We have been having this kind 
of division of labor for many years. I feel a lot of suffering because of this.” She paused 
and added. “Because I am a devout Buddhist, I often receive peace through meditation. 
Sometimes when I feel really bad or am suffering, I will spend a lot of time reading 
sutras. That is really helpful…” When asked how her faith helps her in dealing with this, 
she explained: “I believe that my suffering in this life may be caused by my relations 
with my husband from our previous lives. It may be I have to repay him emotions I owe 
him in our previous life. But I do not have concrete teachings from Buddhism on how to 
deal with marital issues. As a wife, a very traditional person, once I’ve married to him I 
have to be with him. I need to just live with it, and survive from it… ” It seems that as a 
very devout Buddhist, she shows very traditional family ideology. However, such 
traditional views are more drawn from Chinese traditional family culture, instead of 
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directly from her faith. Unlike the conservative Protestants who are actively promoting 
the traditional relations, she has a more passive view about these issues. 
     The in-depth interviews further reveal interesting variations among different 
Christian denominations on gender role attitudes. My interview of the pastor of Zhong-
Yan Presbyterian Church, a small Presbyterian church in Taipei, demonstrates the 
variation among Protestants. When I asked his opinion on the statement of “men’s 
primary job is to earn money, women’s primary job is to take care of family,” he laughed 
and said, “Well, this is how people would think forty or fifty years ago! ... Taiwan is an 
equal society now, and it would be so out-dated and biased to emphasize this.” When I 
asked him about the often-mentioned men’s headship issues in fundamentalist churches, 
he said, “It is a misinterpretation of the Bible if churches only emphasize men’s headship 
and women’s submission, because we are called to mutual submission.” He fully supports 
women’s work outside of the home, and does not think it will be a problem. In reality, his 
wife has never stopped working even after he became a pastor. In a separate meeting with 
Ms Jiang, a regular member of the Zhong-Yan Presbyterian Church, she also expressed 
her support for a double-income lifestyle.  
Compared with conservative groups in Taiwan, mainline Protestants display much 
looser attitudes toward the traditional gender role ideology. Because the majority of 
Protestants in Taiwan are from evangelical and conservative background (Chao 2004), 
this pattern is masked in the survey results. Because the total N for Protestants is so 
small, I cannot differentiate these two groups of Protestants. The fact that the Taiwan 
Presbyterian church (TPC) display such less traditional views are not surprising, as in 
Taiwan’s modern history, TPC as a whole has taken a leading role in promoting Taiwan’s 
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political and cultural democratization and liberalization ( Lin 1990) instead of 
emphasizing evangelism. In their national statement in 1998, they promote gender 
equality in Taiwan as part of their mission7.  
The Catholics in my samples showed even more non-traditional attitudes toward 
gender role issues than their Protestant counterparts. For example, Mrs. Gao, a 
homemaker in her forties who received a Master’s degree in science and raises two 
children, told me: “I have no problem with both husband and wife working if that is what 
they want…That is what the society is like nowadays.” When asked whether and how her 
faith influences her views on gender ideology, she said:  
I don’t feel my Catholic faith affects my view on gender roles at all. You 
live in a modern society, you can be much more influenced by the society 
than by church…. My family has been Catholics for five generations. Even 
my brother is a priest. But I have never heard any teachings from the Church 
specifically addressing gender role issues…It does not seem to be something 
important. 
 
She further added, “My sense is, what matters is people’s background. If people have 
high education and if they live in a big city like Taipei, it is quite common that both 
people work, and both husband and wife contribute to the family…” She also mentioned 
that her husband, a devout Catholic and a professor in a large university, contributes to 
housework almost as much as she does.  
Similarly, in my interview with another Catholic woman, Mrs. Fu, a manager of a 
funeral home, who was converted to Catholicism from Chinese folk religions in her 
thirties, kept on mentioning that she does not know any teaching from the Church 
                                                 
7 For more information, please visit : http://www.pct.org.tw/ 
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regarding family or gender roles. She said: “In terms of gender role ideology, I feel we 
Catholics are no different from anyone else.”   
It seems that, in contrast to the conservative Protestant interviewees, the Catholics I 
interviewed rarely mentioned any religious motivation for or concern about gender 
ideology. Rather than viewing the surrounding mainstream secular culture as “eroding”, 
they tend to accept it and embrace it. Their liberal views and the loose conviction from 
Church make them distinct from the Protestants.    
According to Dr. Wenban Guo, a leading expert on Catholicism in Taiwan, most of 
Taiwanese lay Catholics are very liberal (Guo 1999b). Many of them were baptized at 
birth and rarely attend church during adulthood. The members tend to have a very loose 
connection with church. Thus, it is not surprising that their views can be much influenced 
by the surrounding secular culture. Further, the Taiwan Catholic Church has focused on 
social justice issues and humanitarian services for a long time. Gender role issues have 
not been a major concern for the church. More importantly, as the society tends to view 
the Catholic church as an important cultural agent bringing in “Western civilization,” and 
the stereotype of a Catholics may be someone who is more attracted to western culture or 
someone who is more “open-minded”, such cultural influence might further accentuate 
Catholics’ liberal views toward gender and family relations. Further, most Catholics live 
in urban areas, therefore they may be influenced by urban lifestyles (Guo 1999b). Thus, 
combined altogether, the weak church teachings, the loose connection between church 
and laity, and the liberal western influence might together contribute to Catholics’ more 
liberal views on gender relations compared with other groups.  
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2.8 CONCLUSION     
 
  In summary, drawing on large scale nationally representative survey and in-depth 
interviews, this study examines the association between religion and gender role attitudes 
in Taiwan. As hypothesized, there are religious variations in gender role attitudes, as 
conservative religious groups such as Taiwanese Protestants and members of the new 
religious movement Yi-Guan-Dao are more likely to support traditional gender role 
ideologies, that they are more likely to view women’s work as having negative impact on 
family life and more likely to support the traditional men-as-breadwinner, women-as-
home-maker model; while Catholics and secular groups tend to hold more liberal views on 
gender role issues than their conservative parts, they display less traditional gender views, 
especially regarding men’s participation in the house and financial contribution for the 
household .    
Study limitation and future direction  
    One of the limitations of this study is the very small N for minority groups in the data 
I use. Although Protestants, Catholics, and YGD members seem to indicate very 
interesting and distinctive characteristics in the study, each of them is less than five 
percent of Taiwan total population. Thus, the very small N and large standard error may 
suppress further patterns and variations. It prevents me from further looking at variations 
among different Protestant denominations, or subgroup variations among each group (such 
as Catholic men vs. Catholic women). In order to solve this problem, in my future 
research, I would like to pool different years of data together to get a bigger sample. 
Fortunately, TSCS has repeated questions on religion and family and gender roles in 
different years of data. It will allow me to explore the religion-gender association using a 
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bigger sample.  
    As this study is just a snapshot of religion and gender association in a particular year, 
it is difficult to reflect the changing patterns of the religion-gender association. Especially 
during the past several decades, Taiwan has experienced tremendous social and economic 
change. It is necessary to examine the religion-gender connection overtime. Thus, in my 
further research I will conduct trend analysis utilizing TSCS data from 1984 to 2004.    
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Table 2.1: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Women 
Work Fulltime by Religion and Other Factors (Odds Ratios)  
  Bad for kids  Bad for family life 
Women want family & 
children 
  M1  M 2 M 1 M 2 M1 M2  
Catholic 1.369  .993 1.370  .727 .480 * .404 * 
   (.43)  (.36) (.43)  (.33) (.15)  (.14)  
Protestant 1.025  .869 1.509 * 1.266 * 1.026  1.017  
  (.21)  (.20) (.31)  (.32) (.23)  (.24)  
YGD .672  .746 .696  .795 .772  .796  
  (.20)  (.22) (.22)  (.27) (.26)  (.27)  
Non-
religious .774 ** .729 ** .888  .970 .651 *** .791 * 
  (.07)  (.08) (.09)  (.10) (.07)  (.08)  
Education   1.016   .953 **   .970 ** 
    (.04)   (.04)   (.04)  
City   1.233 *   .853   .912  
    (.11)   (.08)   (.09)  
Age   1.009 *   1.017 ***   .996  
    (.01)   (.01)   (.01)  
Married   .828   .774 *   .941  
    (.10)   (.10)   (.13)  
Child(ren)   1.020   .980   2.037 *** 
    (.17)   (.16)   (.17)  
Male   1.134   1.356 **   1.030  
    (.1)   (.13)   (.10)  
Income   .997   .973 *   .987  
    (.01)   (.01)   (.01)  
Hakka   1.176   1.091   1.091  
    (.15)   (.13)   (.15)  
Mainlander   1.450 *   1.098   1.796  
    (.16)   (.15)   (.12)  
Aboriginal   1.376   1.671 +   1.214  
    (.45)   (.36)   (.40)  
-2log 
likelihood 4790  4760 4550  4432 4151  4074  
N 1977  1977 1977 1977 1977 1977  
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Table 2.2: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Household 
Division of Labor by Religion and Other Factors (Odds Ratios)  
 men breadwinner 
both contribute 
financially 
  M1 M2 M1 M2  
Catholic 2.124 * 1.241 2.453 * 1.977 * 
   (.72)  (.47) (.86)  (.84) 
Protestant .916  .911 .681 + .560 * 
  (.18)  (.20) (.15)  (.13) 
YGD 1.253  1.768 + 1.370  1.140 
  (.41)  (.58) (.47)  (.39) 
Non-
religious .606 *** .803 * .980  .979 
  (.06)  (.08) (.11)  (.11) 
Education   .846 ***   .877 
    (.03)   (.04) 
City   .923   1.058 
    (.09)   (.11) 
Age   1.020 ***   1.005 
    (.01)   (.01) 
Married   .745 *   1.151 
    (.10)   (.16) 
Child(ren)   1.188   .628 * 
    (.19)   (.11) 
Male   1.926 ***   .405 *** 
    (.17)   (.04) 
Income   .996   .998 
    (.01)   (.01) 
Hakka   .905   1.154 
    (.11)   (.15) 
Mainlander   .918   1.106 
    (.13)   (.15) 
Aboriginal   1.181   1.307 
    (.36)   (.43) 
-2log 
likelihood 5384  4954 4054  3950 




Table 2.3:  Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Men’s 
Participation in Housework by Religion and Other Factors (Odds Ratios) 
  men do more housework men do more childrearing 
  M1  M2 M1 M2 
Catholic 2.327 * 2.501 * 2.800 ** 3.179 ** 
   (.87)  (1.01) (.13)  (.11)  
Protestant 1.246  1.125 .000  .901  
  (.24)  (.24) (.21)  (.23)  
YGD .794  .744 1.120  1.040  
  (.24)  (.22) (.27)  (.30)  
Non-
religious 1.186 + .959 1.210 * .955  
  (.08)  (.10) (.08)  (.10)  
Education   1.089 ***   1.081 *** 
    (.03)   (.03)  
City   1.389 **   1.589 *** 
    (.07)   (.06)  
Age   1.003   .996  
    (.01)   (.01)  
Married   1.028   .876  
    (.13)   (.15)  
Child(ren)   .688 *   .904  
    (.23)   (.18)  
Male   .895   .850 + 
    (.10)   (.10)  
Income   .997   .977  
    (.01)   (.01)  
Hakka   1.050   1.008  
    (.14)   (.12)  
Mainlander   1.227   1.351 * 
    (.15)   (.15)  
Aboriginal   1.155   .954  
    (.35)   (.32)  
-2log 
likelihood 5004  4888 4842  4699  
N 1977  1977 1977 1977 
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Drawing on Taiwan Social Change Surveys (1990 and 2000) and field interviews, this 
chapter explores the religious effects on educational aspirations and gender (in)equality in 
education in Taiwan. Contra expectation, there is no significant gender gap among 
different religions on educational aspirations. The real variation lies in the overall 
different levels of educational aspirations for both boys and girls. After controlling other 
socio-demographic factors, Taiwanese Protestants show the highest educational 
aspirations for both boys and girls; new religious movement Yi-Guan-Dao members 
show the lowest aspirations; Catholics, traditional religionists, and secular respondents 
are in the middle and do not have significant differences on education among each other. 






3.2 INTRODUCTION   
 
Chinese culture has emphasized education for thousands of years, but only education 
for men. Chinese women were excluded from formal education until the late 19th centenary 
(Huang 1996, Lutz 1971, Ng 2003). Subsequent modernization and mandatory education 
have helped women’s educational develop (Xu and Lai 2002); but, there is still a significant 
gender gap in educational attainment, especially at higher education levels (Chiu and Tsai 
1992).  For example, in 2006, 46 percent of registered university students in Taiwan were 
women; 32 percent of Masters’ students and 23 percent of doctoral students were women 
(Taiwan Ministry of Education data)8. Thus, rapid educational and economic expansion did 
not bring equal growth of in the level and quality for women’s education in Taiwan (Chiu 
and Tsai 1992).  
Economists and demographers have given substantial attention to gender inequality in 
education in Taiwan. Although using different methods and data, they generally agree that 
there are some unexamined cultural factors which may explain this disparity. Although 
Taiwan has developed dramatically during the past several decades, the patriarchic family 
nature stays strong. Especially the emphasis on education for men still seems to be strong. 
What aspect(s) of culture influences women’s educational attainment and people’s beliefs 
about education? Because religion is an important carrier of Chinese traditional norms, how 
does religion affect people’s educational achievement and expectation? Does religion 
promote or hinder educational aspirations in Taiwan? Is there variation between Chinese 
traditional religions and western religions such as Christianity in relating to education 
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outcomes in such context? In this article, using national representative data, I will explore 
the questions.  
3.3 BACKGROUND  
 
3.3.1 RELIGION AND EDUCATION IN THE U.S.  
       Numerous studies have shown the association between religion and educational 
achievement in the United States. For example, Jews in the U.S. tend to have the highest 
educational achievement among all religious groups, while fundamental Protestants show 
the lowest educational attainment especially when measured by “Biblical Literalism”, with 
mainline Protestants and Catholics in the middle (Darnell and Sherkat 1997; Sherkat and 
Darnell 1999, Glass and Jacobs 2005). Such religious variation is often accentuated among 
women’s educational achievements with white conservative Protestants women tending to 
display the lowest post-graduate levels of education (Glass and Jacobs 2005).  
       Personal religiosity is also associated with educational achievement. For example, 
in Regnerus’ study (Regnerus and Elder 2003), adolescents who attend church more often 
report higher educational achievements than their less religious peers; Ellison and Muller 
also demonstrate that religiosity can even counter some negative racial effects, in that 
religious black children tend to have greater educational achievements (Muller and Ellison 
2001).   
      There are several reasons why religion may be associated with educational 
outcomes:  
      (1) Conservative religious groups such as conservative Protestants in the U.S. tend 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 For more information, please visit www.mov.gov.tw 
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to hold traditional gender role ideology which discourages women from pursuing higher 
education. In such traditions, men’s headship in a household is divinely granted, and thus 
women’s primary role is a wife and mother. Women are often encouraged to marry earlier, 
to stay home, and to have more children. Pursuing higher education and a career may 
interfere with women’s responsibility for family life. Thus the incentives for pursuing 
higher education for women may be discouraged in such context.                            
(2) Religion can also influence perceptions of investment in education. For example, 
using economic models, Evelyn Lehrer (2005) points out that religion can affects how 
parents perceive the value and cost of education, and thus they make more or less 
investment into children’s education. If the parents perceive women’s primary role is to take 
care of family and children, investing in higher education for a girl may not be necessary. 
Thus they might be more reluctant to invest more in women’s higher education. Moreover, 
if religious believers view the contemporary educational systems as secular, and suspect it 
may do spiritual harm to their children, they may discourage their children from pursuing 
higher education in the contemporary education systems. On the other hand, Jews in the 
U.S. tend to emphasize the accumulation of wealth and high educational achievement as a 
way to maintain their comparative higher social status in the U.S. (Keister 2003). Thus, 
Jews may be more likely to have higher expectations for education. However, this evidence 
is all from the U.S., a context with a long history of Protestantism, religious competition, 
and state provision of education which may not hold in other social contexts. 
In international studies, scholars often argue that religion influences the provision of 
and attainment in education. For example, scholars pointed out that because Protestant 
missionaries wanted people to read the Bible, they initiated or promoted mass education and 
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education for women in many non-western societies (Lutz 1971, Ng 1998, Woodberry and 
Shah 2004). On the other hand, as Catholics did not focus on spreading mass education, as 
the priesthood is the sole authority for reading and explaining the Bible. Thus they are less 
likely to promote education at the same level.  
Despite these historical studies, we have little empirical research examining religious 
effects on education in non-western societies, where the dominant religious culture is not 
Judeo-Christian.    
3.3.2 Religion and Education in Taiwan society  
 
The distribution of education by sex is frequently argued to be a key determinant of 
gender inequality (e.g., Parish and Willis 1993). In order to understand how traditional 
religions may influence education aspirations, it is necessary to understand the 
connection between Chinese family culture and education.    
Traditional Culture, religion, and Education in Taiwan  
 
First, the patriarchal nature of society may affect women’s education. Historically 
Chinese societies emphasize men’s education through the Confucianism exam system. 
The goal for Confucianism education is to get a high ranking official job after passing the 
exams. Since women were excluded from the traditional bureaucratic system, women 
were excluded from Confucianism classical education. Rich families may hire private 
tutors to teach daughters how to read, however, the level of education provided for 
daughters was often very limited. Although there is no official exclusion of women from 
education anymore, in a patriarchic society it is often easier for men to succeed. On 
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average, men have more job opportunities and earn more than women for similar jobs on 
average (Parish and Willis 1993). Contemporary Taiwanese higher education is a very 
expensive investment, thus parents may be less willing to invest in more in daughters as 
they have high cost but potential lower return (Parish and Willis 1993).   
Second, traditional family ideologies may influence women’s educational outcomes. 
In traditional Chinese society, elder parents expect to live with their sons, especially the 
oldest sons, who are expected to be the primary caretakers for their elder parents. 
Daughters will eventually marry out of their maternal family（嫁出去的女儿泼出去的
水）and thus are not considered a reliable source of old-age security. Daughters are 
expected to be devoted to the wellbeing of their husband’s families. Once women are 
married, they will be considered their in-law family’s property. Thus from an economic 
perspective, scholars argue that parents will invest more in sons’ education rather than 
daughters because they themselves will have a better reward and a lower risk financial 
investment (Greenhalgh 1985). Financial constraint of a family can further accentuate son 
preference in education (Parish and Willis 1993).  
Third, the idea of marriageability can influence women’s educational outcomes in 
Chinese societies (Tsai, Gates, and Chiu 1994). Influenced by traditional Confucian 
culture, women are often expected to marry up, meaning men prefer to have higher 
education than their wives. It is not only a traditional belief but also an ongoing practice 
in Taiwan (Tsai 1987). A woman who has much high education will naturally reduce her 
pool of potential husbands on the marriage market, as men tend not to prefer women who 
have more education than they do. As long as women's primary role is considered to be 
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family care-taker, wife and mother, spending a long time in school can be perceived as 
delaying women’s opportunity to get married and to bear children. Further, as women’s 
social achievements are often believed to come through marriage (学得好不如嫁得好), 
in a society in which marriage is almost universal and families often put high pressure on 
women to get married, a woman’s pursuit of higher education can be greatly discouraged. 
In many cases, “sufficient education” instead of “high education” is expected under such 
a context. Thus, the more people hold such traditional beliefs, the more likely they will 
hold a negative impression toward women’s higher education, and the more likely they 
will discourage women from pursuing higher education.   
Fourth, although women’s education may be expected to increase with industrial 
development and expansion of women’s labor force participation, it is not necessarily the 
case. During the past several decades, Taiwan’s economic opportunities have grown 
dramatically, it has become one of the primary export societies in the world. There is 
great demand from skill-intensive occupations that provide women increasing job 
opportunities (Zveglich et.al. 1997). Many such jobs are characterized by low technical 
requirements and a quick return for earning. However, one of the consequences of this 
changing economy is the on-going conflict between such increasing low-skill job 
opportunities available for unmarried Taiwanese women and the ongoing pricing higher 
education. Parents must decide whether they want to invest more in their daughter’s 
education or send them into the labor force to make money quickly, help the family’s 
finances, repay the parents’ investment before they marry, and maybe help provide for 
their brother’s education (Greenhalgh 1985). Thus, after daughters have “sufficient” 
education, pragmatic and traditional minded parents may want to encourage their 
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daughters to work instead of pursuing higher education. Even when parents invest in their 
daughters’ education, they may be more likely to invest in those types of education that 
can bring quick financial returns such as junior colleges or technical schools (Greenhalgh 
1985, Brinton 1993). Such conflicts are accentuated especially when the family has 
scarce resources (Yu and Su 2006). Gender inequality may particularly exist at higher 
levels of education.  
   Chinese traditional religions have a strong association with Chinese traditional 
family ideologies. As most folk or traditional religions do not make ethical requirements 
in their teachings or rituals, most adopt Confucianism as their ethical orthodoxy. 
Traditional religionists tend to promote early marriage and encourage larger traditional 
families (Chiu 2006). In many folk religion families, relational hierarchy based on male 
ancestor worship is often emphasized (Yang 1967). Although traditional Confucianism 
tends to emphasize education for boys, because the educational achievement of a son can 
bring honor to the family and ancestors, it does not extend to education for girls and 
women; traditional religionists may also encourage boy’s education more than girl’s 
education. Further, because of the strong pragmatic or utilitarian tendency of traditional 
religions, they might also more likely to emphasize investing more in men’s education, so 
that they can have higher chance of success and have more chances to earn money or find 
jobs with education.  
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Christianity Influence on education in Taiwan  
 
        There are competing hypotheses about how Christianity might influence 
education in Taiwan: First, unlike Chinese traditional religions’ emphasis on rituals and 
ceremonies, Christianity, especially Protestantism, emphasizes Scripture-reading in order 
to understand theology. As reading and studying the scripture is a necessity for one’s 
Christian faith, it is difficult for people who are illiterate or have lower educational 
background to access the Gospel (Su 2006). Thus in order to spread the Gospel, 
Protestant missionaries have often promoted mass education and literacy in non-western 
countries so that people can read the Bible in their own languages (Ng 2003, Roberts 
2002, Woodberry and Shah 2004). The existence of large number of “Bible women” who 
have become literate in East Asia is a typical manifestation (Ng 2003, Lutz 1971). Not 
only did these Christians promote mass education, they often provided religious 
programs, religious educators, or directly established educational institutions in those 
places. Such influence is not only for mass education, but also for higher education. For 
example, the earliest five universities and women’s colleges in Taiwan were funded by 
Christian educators (Lin 2003). As women were historically excluded from formal 
educational system in Chinese societies, accessing education through such religious 
institutions allow families to gain women education inexpensively.      
 Second, Christian educators promoted modern education to undercut the influence 
of Confucianism and “superstitious” folk culture in Chinese societies (e.g. Lin 2003, 
Rubinstein 1991, Ng 1985, Woodberry and Shah 2004). Christians as a minority in 
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Taiwan who are surrounded by an overwhelming majority of traditional religious culture 
may further accentuate the need for promoting modern education. Consist with historical 
patterns, Taiwanese Christians might also specially emphasize women’s education as 
women are believed to have an irreplaceable influence over their children’s and 
husband’s religion (Lutz 1971). Thus, I expect Christians in Taiwan will emphasize 
higher education for both boys and girls.  
Third, Taiwanese Christian’s unique socio-demographic characteristics may affect 
their attitudes toward education. Taiwanese Christians tend to be middle or upper middle 
classes, and a disproportionate number of them are white-collar workers, high technology 
professionals, government or military officers. Thus, they may be like Jews in the U.S. 
who emphasize the accumulation of social capital and wealth (Su 2006). Because of the 
need to maintain their comparatively elite social status, emphasizing education may 
become a necessity. In return, people who are from comparatively middle or upper class 
may be more likely to value and invest more in children’s education in a way to assure 
the continuity of their status. As men from these backgrounds might also be expected to 
marry women who are from similar backgrounds, Christian parents may emphasize 
women’s education because of the concern of marriageability. Thus I expect that the 
socio-demographic characteristics of Christians will influence them to have higher 
educational aspiration in this context.  
        However, it is also possible that fundamentalist Christian groups in Taiwan may 
be similar to the fundamental conservative Protestant counterparts in the U.S., where 
higher education, especially higher education for women is discouraged (Sherkat 2000, 
Glass and Jacobs 2005). As women’s roles are primarily based at home and childrearing, 
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higher education might be discouraged. This study will examine these assumptions in the 
Taiwan context. 
  
3.3.3 REASONS TO STUDY EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATION INSTEAD OF CURRENT 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT  
      As TSCS data are repeated cross-sectional data instead of longitudinal data, it is 
difficult to distinguish a causal effect from a spurious association. More specifically, (1) as 
mentioned in previous chapters, Taiwanese Christians are disproportionally middle class, 
white collar professionals, and highly educated, thus it could be that Christianity is more 
likely to attract highly educated people, or it could be that Christianity increases higher 
educational aspirations. In other words, Christianity merely attracts more educated people 
rather than providing them. If one only predict current education level using religion, it 
could produce a spurious relationship. I illustrate the problem by showing the association 
between religion and educational level using TSCS 1990 and 2000 data. For example in 
1990, the mean years of education for male Christian is 10.92 years, while the mean 
education level for devoted traditionalists is 7.39, which is about 3.5 years lower (Figure 
3.1). While in 2000, the mean years of educational attainment for male Christians is 12.16 
years, which is about 2 years longer than male Chinese traditional religionists (Figure 3.2). 
Although the comparative religious difference reduced over time, there is still a significant 
religious difference in education level. These patterns are even clearer for the higher 
education as shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. For example, it shows in Figure 3.3 in 
1990 about 40% of Catholic men and 27% of Catholic women had an undergraduate 
degree or higher education, compared with only 7% of devout male traditional religionists 
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and 6% devout women traditional religionists. In 2000 about a quarter of Protestant men 
and about 17 % of Protestant women have an undergraduate degree or higher education, 
compared with only 12 % of devoted male traditionalists and 8% female traditional 
religionists (Figure 3.4). Although the religious variations on educational levels have 
diminished, there are still significant differences in overall educational level and on higher 
levels of education for both men and women (tested by Scheffe command in STATA). 
However, in order to minimize the possibility of spuriousness, I use educational 
aspirations instead of current educational attainment.  
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       My primary data come from the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS). It is a 
replicated cross-sectional survey conducted by the Academia Sinica, Taiwan. It has been 
conducted almost annually since 1984, and is a national probability sample of about 
2,000 adults between 20 to 75 years old. Analogous to the U.S. General Social Survey 
(GSS), TSCS covers a wide range of topics such as family, education, religion, 
occupation, political participation, etc. I use the cultural modules from 1990 and 2000 for 
this study, which include various topics including respondent’s attitudes toward education 
and actual levels of education, religious background, and various socio-demographic 
variables. My primary analysis is based on the 2000 culture data. In order to further 
examine the hypotheses, I use 1990 data with the same questions to further test my 
findings. 
       In addition to my quantitative analyses, I also conducted 22 in-depth interviews 
in Taipei with knowledgeable informants in June 2007. My 22 interviewees come from 
various religious and social backgrounds. My original sampling of TSCS 2000 sampling 
respondents list was not successful, thus, in order to get a useful sample in a very limited 
time, I constructed a purposive sample with the counsel from Dr. Hei-yuan Chiu and 
many other scholars in Taiwan. They helped me to select a sample taking the religion, 
gender, residence, ethnicity, education and social background of respondents into 
consideration. My final sample included 22 successful interviews with both clergies and 
lay worshippers from all the major religious groups I studied in the quantitative research. 
There are four Buddhists, including one master, one abbot, and two devout lay Buddhists; 
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there are three folk religion practioners, one is an accountant in a folk temple, one is Taxi 
driver, and one runs a computer shop; there is one new religious movement (YGD) 
teacher; there are seven Catholics, including one priest, one nun, and five lay members 
from various social backgrounds; finally, there are seven Protestants from various 
denominations, with two pastors and five lay Protestants. My qualitative discussions are 





 Measuring religion is a complicated issue in Chinese societies. The distinctions 
between different Chinese religious traditions are vague. Even though in surveys people 
self-identify as Taoists, Buddhists, or Folk religionists, in reality, there are no clear 
boundaries between these three religions especially for ordinary worshippers. Deities 
are worshipped as long as they are efficient in bringing blessings and protection. Thus, 
scholars tend to treat them under the broad rubric of “Chinese traditional religion.” 
However, differences may exist between very devout traditional religionists and 
ordinary lay members. For example, very devout Buddhists will go through a formal 
conversion ritual. After the ritual, they will be given a formal Buddhist name, become a 
disciple of a certain Buddhist lineage, and may become vegetarian. Nominal Buddhists 
usually do not go through the conversion ritual, recite sutra often, or follow rigid 
meditation requirements. They might worship other folk deities at the same time and are 
more likely to switch deities when one is not efficient enough (Chiu 2006). In both the 
1990 and 2000 surveys, other than the basic question: “what is your religion,” 
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respondents were also asked: “how important is your religion to you?” I utilize these 
two questions together to create two dummy variables: devout traditional religionists 
(DTR) and nominal traditional religionists (NTR) in order to examine the potential 
difference between devoted worshippers and nominal ones. If respondent identifies with 
any of the three traditional religions and he or she also considers religion is “very 
important” or “important” to them, it will be coded as 1 (devout traditional religionist), 
or 0 (otherwise); if respondents belong to any of these traditional religionists but do not 
consider their religion is important I coded them as nominal traditional religionists.  
Thus the final categories include: Protestant, Catholic, Devout traditional religionists 
(DTR), nominal traditional religionists (NTR), New religious movement group Yi-
Guan-Dao (YGD), and non-religious respondents. The devout Chinese traditional 
religionists are the largest group and the reference category in my analyses. 9 
Education measures 
 
Minimum Educational aspiration for boys and for girls (MIBOY/BIGIRL): In both 
1990 and 2000 TSCS, respondents were asked: “What do you think is the minimum 
education a boy should have,” and “what do you think is the minimal education a girl 
should have?”  Response categories range from 1 (elementary) to 6 (graduate school). I 
coded the variables in a way that the higher scores indicate higher aspiration for boy or 
                                                 
9 In my preliminary analyses, I also created separate categories for “devout Protestant” and “nominal 
Protestant”. However, as more than 80% of Christians in TSCS consider their religion is “important”, or 
“very important”, and there are no statistically significant differences between these two categories, I 
combined them into one category, “Protestant” in the final model. Because Catholics are already very small 
group (less than 40), I remain them as one group. I also used “nominal traditional religionist”, “non-
religious”, “YGD”, “Catholic”, and “Protestant” as the reference groups in a set of parallel models. In order 
to save space, I did not include these repeated supplementary models in this final version. If interested, 
please contact author for the full models.  
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for girl.  
     Minimum education is university level or higher (BOYUV/GIRLUV):  Because 
Taiwan has 9 years of mandatory education (middle school graduate), and about 98% of 
Taiwan’s population have access to high school education (Taiwan Yearbook 2004), I 
expect the actual variation in educational aspirations will exist only in higher education 
levels. Thus, I created dummy variables indicating whether respondent considers the 
minimum education for a boy or for a girl is university level or higher ( for each gender, 
1=yes, 0=otherwise). 10 
      Educational aspiration gap between boys and girls (ASPGAP): In order to further 
examine my hypotheses that religion will have significant association with gender 
inequality on education, I created a variable measuring the reported difference in 
aspirations for boys and girls.  The value is calculated as follow:  
ASPGAP= MIBOY-MIGIRL 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 The original questionnaire has a seventh item: “other-please explain.” A large proportion of respondents 
chose this response option. However, the codebook does not state what answers respondents gave, thus I 
was unable to recode it. For example in 2000, 110 out of 1895 respondents chose “other” for boys 
educational aspirations and 116 out of 1895 respondents chose “other” regarding girl’s educational 
aspirations. More interestingly, Protestants disproportionately choose this category. I assume most 
respondents meant “Whatever the child wants” or “study abroad,” but I have no way to test this.  Future 
investigation is needed to determine what “other” means and why Protestants are more likely to choose it. 
  
  Boy Girl 
Devout Traditional 5.8% (36) 5.8%(36) 
Nominal Traditional 6.1% (43) 6.3%(45) 
Catholic 3.9% (1) 3.9%(1) 
Protestant 11.0%(10) 12.1%(11) 
YGD 4.9% (2) 4.9%(2) 
Non-religious 4.5% (17) 5.3%(20) 




A high score for ASPGAP indicates higher preference for boy’s education over girl’s 
education.  
Other covariates 
I also controlled gender (male=1, 0=otherwise), age(in years), region (city=1, 0= 
otherwise), education (in years), Ethnicity (Minnan-reference group, Hakka, Mainlander, 
Aboriginal), self-evaluated SES11 (from 1=low class to 6=upper class), and marital status 
(1=married, 0=otherwise).   
3.6 RESULTS  
[Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 about here]  
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 compare higher education aspirations by religion in 1990 
and 2000 respectively. In each of the graph, the blue bars represents the percent of 
respondents in each group agree that think the minimum education for a boy is university 
graduation or higher; the red bars represents the percent of respondents in each group that 
think the minimum education for a girl is university graduation or higher. For a complete 
comparison of educational aspirations in 1990 and 2000, please refer to Table 2-1 and 
Table 2-2. In order to save space, I will not discuss all the differences in these two tables.  
Regarding aspiration for boy’s education, figure 3.5 shows that in 1990 about 37% of 
Taiwan Protestants believe that the minimum education for a boy is university graduation 
or beyond, compared with only 20% of traditional religionists and about 24% of 
                                                 
11 The income measure has many missing cases on the TSCS. For example, on the 1990 TSCS, 329 
(13%) responded “don’t know,” 144 (5.7%) refused to answer, and 4 had “no answer." In totally 477 
out of 2532 respondents did not provide their income. The 2000 TSCS had 106 missing cases.  
Fortunately, on TSCS 2000 there is a measure of “self-evaluated social class background” Thus, I used 
this measure for SES instead of household income. Unfortunately, in the 1990 data there is no similar 
measure of social class. 
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Catholics; the least proportion of YGD believers (11%) view a university education is a 
must for boys. Respondents’ attitudes toward girl’s education show a similar pattern: in 
1990, about a third of Protestants thought girls should have at least a university graduate 
education in 1990, compared to less than 8% of YGD and 13% of Catholics and 
traditional religions. 
    The 2000 results (Figure 3.6) are similar to the 1990 data (Figure 3.5). 
Protestants have the highest percentage who favor university degree for women. 
Specifically, about half of Protestants favor a minimum university education for girls, 
compared with only 20 % of YGD (the lowest) and about 30 percent of traditional 
religionists believe so; non-religious respondents show the second highest percentage of 
favoring higher education for girls (38% respectively); Catholics are not much different 
from the mass traditional religionists regard aspiration. According to SCHEFFE test 
comparing the differences and significance of means by pair (in STATA), the differences 
between Protestants and other religious groups are statistically significant; YGD show 
significantly lower aspirations compared with other groups. However, there is no 
significant difference among traditional religion groups and Catholics according to the 
tests.   
We can also compare the gender gap in aspirations for boys and for girls within each 
group. In every group, it seems that more people think men should have higher education 
than women, and the gender gap is not significantly larger for any religious group. 
Further, when comparing the 1990 results (Figure 3.5) with the 2000 results (Figure 3.6), 
it seems that the gender gap within each groups has reduced overtime, especially for the 
Catholics. The only exception is that the gender gap for Protestants increased from about 
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5 % to 9% from 1990 to 2000. This may be also related to random variation because of 
very small N in both years. For more detailed comparison, please refer to Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.2. 
    [Table 3.3 to Table 3.4 about here] 
To further examine whether religious differences are statistically significant, I added 
controls for other social factors. I utilize ordered logistic regression models to examine 
the religious effects on educational aspirations. The dependent variables (minimum 
educational aspiration for a boy and for a girl) are coded as ordinal variables from 
“1=elementary school,” to “6=graduate school.” In each table, there are four columns; the 
first two columns show the results predicting aspirations for boys and the last two 
columns show the results predicting aspirations for girls. For each pair of models I 
include a base model with only religion variables and a full model adding other social 
factors. 
Table 3.3 shows odds ratios for ordered logistic regression models predicting 
education aspirations by religion in 1990. Compared with devout traditional religionists, 
Protestants show significantly higher educational aspirations for both boys and girls with 
other factors taken into control (OR=1.85, p<.01, OR=2.07, p<.05 respectively); nominal 
traditional religionists and non-religious respondents also have modestly higher 
educational aspirations for boys but not significantly higher for girls (e.g., for boys, OR= 
1.24, p<.05, OR=1.22, p<.10 respectively). In my supplementary analyses, Protestants 
also have higher educational aspirations for both boys and girls than nominal traditional 
religionists, YGD, Catholics, and non-religious respondents.   
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Table 3.4 shows identical models for the year 2000. The findings are consistent with 
the 1990 data: after controlling all socio-demographic factors, Protestants still have 
higher education aspirations for both boys and girls compared with devout traditional 
religionists (OR=2.02, p<.01, OR=1.72, p<.05 respectively). Nominal traditional 
religionists also display modestly higher aspirations for boys compared with their devout 
counterparts (OR=1.22, p<.10). My supplementary analyses show that again in 2000 
Protestants have significantly higher educational aspirations than any other group for both 
boys and girls.   
Comparing the 1990 and 2000 results, the impact of religion (especially 
Protestantism) seems to be very consistent. One possible exception is the comparative 
advantage of Protestantism in educational aspiration for girls may be diminishing over 
time (OR=2.07, p<.01 in 1990 and OR=1.72, p<.05 respectively). This is consistent with 
the descriptive patterns we have seen in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6. This “reduction” could 
merely be the result of sample variation from the small N for Protestants in both years, or 
it could mean that as the overall level of education increases and the government 
promotes gender-equal education, the comparative Protestant advantage for girls is being 
reduced.  
Besides the main findings, there are also other findings worthy of notice. For 
example, people who are more educated, who live in the cities, are married, or are older 
are more likely to have higher educational aspirations for both boys and girls. Men tend 
to have lower educational aspirations for boys and girls than women.  
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However, I did not find significant variation in the gender gap in education 
aspirations between religious groups. Thus, in order to save space, I did not include those 
models in this final version.  
3.7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION  
 
In summary, my original hypotheses are partly supported: Religion does have 
significant estimated association with educational aspiration in Taiwan. Compared with 
other religious groups, Taiwanese Protestants display the highest levels of educational 
aspiration for both boys and girls; on the other hand new religious movement YGD 
members tend to display the lowest educational aspiration; Catholics, Non-religious 
respondents, and nominal Chinese traditional religionists are in the middle, and there is 
no significant difference among those groups on educational aspiration. However, my 
original hypothesis of there will be significant gender gap among different religious 
groups was not supported, meaning, my original hypothesis is certain religious group, 
e.g., devout traditional religionists or YGD members would prefer greater gender 
inequality in education than other groups, especially Christian groups, are not supported. 
In 2000, there is no significant gap within each group regarding education for boy and for 
girl, and there is no significant variation among different groups on gender gap of 
education. The real difference lies in the overall level of aspiration for education.  
FIELD INTERVIEWS 
   My field research shed light on why religion in Taiwan and supported my quantitative 
findings. There is no significant difference with on gender gap of education across 
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religious groups. Most of the interviewees with whom I spoke mentioned that boys and 
girls should have equal education. 
       For example, when I asked “what is the minimum education you think a boy/girl 
should have,” Mr. Chang, a pastor at the Church of Revival, a small fundamental/ 
evangelical church, told me that: “the higher the better.” Mr. Chang, added, “Well, for 
my own kids, I will support them as much as they want to pursue, even if they want to 
have a Ph.D.” However, he emphasized, “education should be something that children 
enjoy; if I give them too much pressure, they might not like it anymore. But whatever 
they want to learn, I will support them.” Although he focuses on his supportive role, he 
would like to make it clear that it is not like the old-time authoritarian Chinese parents 
who only want children to study. He also explained that he knows Christians in Taiwan 
disproportionally study or live abroad including members of his family, that these 
overseas experiences make people more open-minded and more likely to welcome 
Western education. In other words, rather than viewing education as a negative influence, 
he as a pastor, emphasizes on the “modern” and “advanced” side of education. Echoing 
with what I have mentioned in the earlier section, the special role of Christianity in 
modern Taiwan’s history might contribute to such views.  
    Ms. Wang, an active member of a large Pentecostal church, explained why she 
desires higher education, from a different perspective. Ms. Wang is married with two 
children and now works in a governmental office as an accountant. She thinks that the 
minimum education a boy and a girl should get is a university degree. She said: 
“education can increase people’s curiosity for truth and knowledge, and that will help 
people eventually realize that the day-to-day material things are not enough for a 
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meaningful life, that our minds and souls desire something more.” She added. 
“Ultimately, this type of thinking will help you to know the Gospel, to desire for God.” 
She also mentioned. “Education can help Christians learn effective communication tools 
when spreading the Gospel to people.” In reality, her daughter has just received her 
Master’s degree and will go to the New York University to pursue her study in design 
this summer. This again confirms my hypothesis that one of the reasons Taiwanese 
Christians value education is because it can be used as an effective tool to spread the 
Gospel and to fight against the influence of folk pragmatic culture.   
       On the other hand, my four lay Catholic interviewees presented different 
explanations. Mr. and Mrs. Chen, who are in their late 40s and both work in 
governmental bureaus, think that the minimal education should be junior college for both 
boys and girls. They explained:  
During recent years Taiwan has gone through a quick educational 
expansion. Many new junior colleges and universities are mushrooming in a 
very short time. However, we are really not sure about those schools’ 
quality. Nowadays, a college graduate might not be even as mature as a high 
school graduate 10 years ago… So in terms of current education, I would 
say the minimum is junior college or university.  
 
Similarly, another lay Catholic, Ms. Gao, shared a similar concern. Ms. Gao, a five 
generation Catholic, married with two children, now is a fulltime homemaker, said to me: 
“Men and women should have equal education, that is no doubt. But because the quality 
of Taiwan colleges or universities is really questionable, I am not sure how much children 
can really learn from them, so a university education is the minimum.”  
The other two Lay Catholics with whom I spoke, Ms. Qiu, the manager of a funeral 
home, and Ms Hong, a middle school principle, displayed more flexible attitudes toward 
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education. They both mentioned that they do not have fixed expectations for the minimal 
education. Ms Giu said: “It really depends on the kids themselves. Whatever they want to 
do, we will support them.” It seems that compared with the conservative Protestants I 
interviewed, the Catholics I interviewed said their religious views had little influence on 
their educational expectations. Instead, their expectations for their children are influenced 
to a greater extent by their own social conditions, education background, and what they 
perceive as mainstream culture.   
Similar to the Catholics, Mr. Tai, a nominal traditional religionist, an owner of a 
computer shop and a father of two children, also stressed the importance of having a 
college degree in current Taiwan. He said: “for me and my wife, we did not have a 
chance to receive good education. That is why we have to labor so much now to make 
money… For the kids nowadays if they do not go to college, they will not find any 
job…” He expects both of his children, a son and a daughter, to finish their study at a 
local college. He and his wife run the computer shop in the day time, and he works as a 
Taxi-driver at night, so that they can afford to pay the tuitions. To him, it seems that his 
nominal religious faith does not influence his views on education much. Instead, he draws 
his motivations on education from the perceived pressure of mainstream culture.  
Interestingly, and different from what I expected, the Executive Abbot of the Zhong-
Tai Buddhist Monastery, one of the four largest Buddhist lineages in Taiwan, mentioned 
their promotion and encouragement of education during our interview. Under the 
competition with other religions in Taiwan, Zhong-Tai Temple has donated millions of 
dollars to build elementary schools and high schools throughout Taiwan as their unique 
contribution to society. He explained that although Buddhism does not focus on 
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education, the goal for their temple is to “make Buddhism educational, artistic, academic, 
and close to life” in contemporary Taiwan, so that more educated people can be attracted 
to Buddhism. Through the process, promoting education is an important task. However, 
my interview with the very devout lay Buddhist woman, Mrs. Yang, a homemaker and 
mother of two kids, seems to display more indifferent attitudes toward secular education. 
When asked what should be the minimum education for a boy or a girl, she did not 
directly answer my question but said: “well, it does not really matter how much education 
you have… What matters in life is that you seek the true wisdom in Buddhism, and keep 
on seeking it.”   
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 3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
   Utilizing nationally representative TSCS data from 1990 and 2000 together with 
field interviews, my study examines the impact of religion on educational aspirations in 
Taiwan. First, contra expectation, there is no significant gender gap among different 
religions on educational aspirations. The real variation lies in the overall different levels 
of educational aspirations for both boys and girls. Because of historical background and 
religious motivations, Taiwan Protestants have higher educational aspiration than other 
religious groups; the new religious movement Yi-Guan-Dao members show the lowest 
educational aspirations compared with other groups; while Catholics and Chinese 
religionists are in the middle and do not have significantly different educational attitudes 
between each other. Finally, between 1990 and 2000, the religious and education 
association seems to have been modestly reduced overtime as the overall level of 










































Table 3.1: Percent Comparison of Educational Aspiration by Religion in 1990 
 High school Junior College 
University or 
higher 
 Boy Girl Boy Girl Boy Girl Freq 
DTR 58.8 69.47 21.65 17.14 19.55 13.38 665 
NTR 53.56 67.7 25.55 18.52 20.89 13.78 1096 
Catholic 48.28 59.26 27.59 29.63 24.14 11.11 27 
Protestant 28.4 41.98 34.57 25.93 37.04 32.1 81 
YGD 66.67 84.62 21.57 7.69 11.76 7.69 52 
Non religious 46.05 59.95 29.53 23.61 24.42 16.44 432 











Table 3.2: Percent Comparison of Educational Aspiration by Religion in 2000  





  Boy Girl Boy Girl Boy Girl freq  
DTR 42.38 45.88 23.29 23.29 34.33 30.82 571 
NTR 33.84 38.75 30.05 29.94 36.12 31.31 658 
Catholic 41.67 41.67 29.17 29.17 29.17 29.17 24 
Protestant 26.25 34.18 16.25 17.72 57.5 48.1 79 
YGD 38.46 38.46 38.46 41.03 23.08 20.51 39 
Non religious 31.11 35.85 25.28 25.77 43.61 38.38 357 


















Table 3.3: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Educational Aspiration by Religion 
and Other Factors in 1990 (Odds Ratios). 
 
  Boy Girl  
  M1 M2 M1 M2 
Catholic 1.533  .740   1.412  .711  
Protestant 3.082 *** 1.854 * 2.949 *** 2.071 * 
YGD 0.778  .693   0.681  .734  
Non-religious 1.539 *** 1.067   1.41 ** 1.156  
Nominal 
traditionalist  1.185 + 1.049   1.051  1.145  
Male   .703 ***   .791 ** 
Married   1.084     1.328 * 
Age   1.013 **   1.011 * 
Education   1.108 ***   1.105 *** 
City   1.539 ***   1.431 ** 
Hakka   1.415 **   1.348 * 
Mainlander   1.303 *   1.495 ** 
Aboriginal   1.126     .944  
-2loglikelihood  6248  5964 5834.9  5568  










Table 3.4: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Educational Aspiration by Religion 
and Other Factors in 2000 (Odds Ratios). 
 
  Boy Girl  
  M1 M2 M1 M2 
Catholic .982  .560   1.173  .819  
Protestant 2.696 *** 2.027 ** 2.099 ** 1.717 * 
YGD .861  .795   .985  .922  
Non-religious 1.511 ** 1.190   1.467 ** 1.173  
Nominal traditionalist  1.225 * 1.219 + 1.198 + 1.200 + 
Male   .798 *   .787 ** 
Married   1.364 *   1.441 ** 
Age   1.019 ***   1.018 *** 
Education   1.159 ***   1.158 *** 
City   1.477 ***   1.400 ** 
Hakka   1.236     1.222  
Mainlander   .901     .898  
Aboriginal   1.747     1.292  
SES   1.140 **   1.145 ** 
-2loglikelihood  4830  4645 4803  4616  
















     Numerous studies suggest that religion is a major factor leading people to oppose 
abortion in the U.S. However, most of those studies are limited in two areas: (1) scholars 
know very little about how religion is associated with abortion in non-Western societies, 
where non-Judeo Christian religious traditions have been dominant; (2) most of the 
studies examined the association between religion and abortion attitudes, little research 
has explored the association between religion and abortion behaviors. Using a nationally 
representative sample of married women in Taiwan, I investigate how religion affects 
both attitudes toward abortion and abortion behavior in a Chinese cultural context. The 
results indicate that conservative religious groups, such as devout Protestants and 
members of the New Religious Movement Yi-Guan-Dao are the most likely to 
disapprove of abortion, compared to nominal and secular groups. My field interviews 
further supported such findings. However, in terms of abortion behavior, nominal 









       In 2004, the Taiwanese government reported that Taiwan has the highest 
abortion rate in East Asia. As Taiwan has transitioned from a primarily agricultural 
society to a highly industrialized society over the past half century, the fertility rate 
decreased dramatically below the replacement level. In 1964 the fertility rate was 3.8 
children per woman, while in 2004 it was merely 1.2. At the same time, abortion is 
widespread. Abortion was practiced in Taiwan long before it became legal in 1985 
(Rahma, Katzive, and Henshaw 1998), and private clinics were easily accessible. But 
now the abortion practice is probably more prevalent. Although scholars disagree over 
the exact number of abortion obtained in Taiwan each year, they agree that the number is 
very large. For example, governmental Taiwan Institute of Family Planning estimates 
suggest that the number of abortions is around 320,000 annually; while non-
governmental medical statistics estimate the number is above 500,000 (Tietze and 
Henshaw 1986, Freedman et al. 1994). Wang and Lin report that in metropolitan areas the 
abortion rate is about 50%, meaning there is probably one abortion per every live birth 
(Wang and Lin 1995). This abortion rate is much higher than Western countries (e.g., 
according to Guttmacher Institute, the current U.S. abortion rate is one abortion per three 
live births).   
      On the other hand, Taiwan is also a traditional society. The majority of the 
population still holds traditional Confucianism family norms and gender role ideologies. 
One’s devotion and obligation to the family is highly emphasized. Why then is abortion 
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so commonly accepted and practiced? As religion intertwines with Chinese traditional 
culture, how does religion affect abortion? How do different religious groups view and 
treat abortion? Does religion matter in such a context, or are religious teachings 
compromised under conventional family culture? Although abortion is widely studied in 
the U.S., we know little about how religious beliefs affect abortion attitudes in non-
western societies, where non-Judeo Christian traditions are dominant. Thus it is difficult 
to determine whether it is conservative religions in general or specific Judeo-Christian 
traditions that discourage abortion. Without empirical studies, we don’t know whether 
Christian religions affect abortion in the same way in other social environments as in the 
U.S. In order to explore these questions, I utilize a large national survey from Taiwan to 
explore how religious affects abortion.  
      Taiwan is an ideal case for testing the consistency of the relationship between 
religion and abortion, because of its considerable religious diversity (Tamney and Chiang 
2002). The majority of the Taiwanese population is religious: approximately 75-80 
percent of the population reported practicing various Chinese traditional religions (e.g., 
Buddhists, Taoists, and many folk religions); about five percent Christian (Protestant and 
Catholic); and about four percent rising New Religious Movement groups (e.g., Yi-Guan-
Dao). Only about 10 percent are not currently affiliated with any religion (Chao 2004, 
Chiu 2006). 
        One of the difficulties for abortion-related research is lack of empirical data on 
obtained abortion. Fortunately, KAP (1998) enumerates the complete pregnancy history 
of more than 2,800 married women in Taiwan, including their reported abortions. 
Although any abortion data carries the risk of underreporting, KAP allows the first 
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empirical study on religion and abortion behavior together with attitudes in a non-western 
cultural context.  
4.3 RESEARCH BACKGROUND   
 
4.3.1 Religion and Abortion in the U.S 
 
       Numerous studies show that religion is among the most influential forces 
influencing abortion in the U.S. Conservative religious groups, such as Catholic and 
conservative Protestant churches, are more likely to oppose abortion than other groups 
(e.g., Ebaugh and Haney 1978; Tamney, Johnson, and Burton 1992; Emerson 1996; 
Evans 2002; Ellison, Echevarria-Cruz, and Smith 2005).   
      There are several common reasons why conservative religions might oppose 
abortion: first, conservative Christians tend to hold strict theology and beliefs regarding 
human life. Citing references in the Bible, they tend to believe life begins at conception 
(e.g., Psalm 139: 13-16, Job 31: 16). Thus, abortion is often considered “killing” or 
murder in such context (www.cbn.com).  
      Secondly, conservative churches tend to emphasize on traditional sexual morality. 
Sex outside of marriage is strongly discouraged (Adamczyk 2006).  They tend to 
encourage women to delay sex until marriage and to marry earlier. This sexual morality 
may discourage the chances of having sex outside of marriage and reduce the number of 
sexual partners. Thus it may reduce the possibilities of having an abortion (Adamczyk 
and Felson 2006).  
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  Thirdly, religion may also influence abortion indirectly via influencing abortion 
policies, state legislation, media, and accessibility of abortion clinics (Adamczyk 2006). 
The percentage of adherents of conservative Protestantism may influence the number of 
abortion clinics that exist in certain region, and certain religious groups may also put 
pressure on public media and state legislature to restrict abortion. 
  Although there are growing variations within certain religious traditions on their view 
toward abortion, scholars have noticed the convergence among religious traditions in 
abortion attitudes in recent years (Sullins 1999; Evans 2002; Hoffmann and Johnson 
2005). Further, the level of acceptance toward abortion can also be mediated by personal 
religiosity and church attendance, in that a more devout people are more likely to oppose 
abortion than their nominal counterparts within the same tradition. 
  Despite abundant research about religion and abortion attitudes, there is little about 
religion and abortion behaviors – partially because of lack of data (Adamczyk 2006). 
Even among demographic studies, most of the work on abortion behaviors is based on 
data collected from questionnaires distributed to pregnant women in abortion clinics (e.g., 
Henshaw & Silverman, 1988; Henshaw and Kost, 1996). Without a random sample it is 
difficult to generalize to the population. Among the few studies of abortion behavior, 
Amy and Jacobs’ work is the only one I can find using a nationally representative sample 
to analyze this association (Adamczyk and Felson 2006).        
Using the data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add 
Health), they examined the association between religion and abortion decisions for the 
first out-of-wed-lock pregnancy of unmarried women. However, despite their 
sophisticated methodology and high quality data, they did not find a significant 
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association between religiosity and abortion decisions among these young unmarried 
women. There was no significant association between importance of religion, frequency 
of prayer, or level of participation of religious youth activities with these reported out-of-
wed-lock pregnancies (Adamczyk and Felson 2006). On the other hand, they did find an 
association between religious denominations and young women’s abortion decisions for 
out-of-wed-lock pregnancy. Young women who are Jews, Catholics, and mainline 
Protestants are more likely to abort their first unmarried pregnancy, while conservative 
Protestants are more likely to carry the pregnancy to term (Adamczyk and Felson 2006). 
This study might be limited by the characters of research subjects. They only look at 
young unmarried women up to their mid-twenties who reported having sexual 
relationship and had an out-of-wed-lock pregnancy between 1996 and 2001. Because 
religious kids are more likely to avoid both sex outside of marriage and dangerous sexual 
behaviors, and if they have sex, they are more likely to know how to use contraception 
correctly (Adamczyk 2006), thus the respondents who are selected in this sample may 
already be more secular than the general population. Also, this is only based on reported 
pregnancy from out-of-wedlock sexual relations. People may underreport their sexual 
relations, pregnancies, and abortions especially when these are related to out-of-wed-lock 
relations. Furthermore, as large percent of abortions are actually conducted by married 
women, as 4 out of 10 unintended pregnancies to married women end in abortion each 
year (Guttmacher Institute 2003), it is important to measure the empirical association 
between religion and abortion behaviors among married women. This study will 




4.3.2 Traditional Culture, Religion, and Abortion in Taiwan 
 
Reasons for abortion      
      There are several common reasons why women abort in the U.S.. The most 
common reason women had an abortion was because having a baby would interfere with 
their ability to study , work, or have personal development (75% of women cited this as 
the number one reason) (Finer et.al. 2005). The second most common reason was they 
could not afford a child. Other common reasons were the women were in an unstable 
relationship, thus they did not want a baby growing up in a single parent family (Finer 
et.al. 2005). The percent of abortions due to rape or abuse is less than 1 percent (Finer 
et.al. 2005). Thus, it seems like the mother’s individual choice is highly valued in thus 
context. However, motivations for abortion may be very different in the Chinese context. 
Especially for married women, her fertility decisions are highly related to the family’s 
wellbeing and the family’s overall interests (especially the in-law families). Thus, for a 
married woman, when there is a conflict between her own interests and her family’s 
benefits, she is often expected to compromise for the sake of meeting her family’s needs 
even the “ancestor’s interests.”    
The patriarchal nature of Taiwanese society is further demonstrated in the Abortion 
Law. The law authorizes and protects husband’s authority over a woman’s decision about 
abortion(Hung 2004). As the law states, when a married woman wants to have abortion, 
she has to have her husband’s consent in order to obtain an abortion. This is very 
different from the situation in the U.S., where abortion is the woman’s choice. In many 
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cases, a husband’s family has great influence over a wife’s pregnancy decisions, because 
a woman’s pregnancy is considered to influence family’s wellbeing especially the need to 
continue family lineages. To bear many children is considered blessed, filial, and 
bringing honor to one’s family and ancestors (多子多福, 光宗耀祖). This reveals a core 
nature of fertility culture in Chinese societies. Not the interest of the woman, nor the 
interest of the fetus, but the interest of the family, may be the most important element to 
consider in making an abortion decision. Married women often bear pressure from their 
spouses and in-laws to have children, especially sons. Thus, I expect that the more 
traditional the family is, the more likely it is to discourage abortion.   
       On the other hand, as long as the husband agrees, the requirements for obtaining 
an abortion are very loose. The law states that if the fetus is deformed or pregnancy might 
“increase the risk of physical or mental health of the mother,” an abortion can be 
obtained. In reality, government hospitals are very loose in interpreting what “risk of 
physical or mental health” means, and in most cases, as long as the husband consents, 
abortions are performed upon request (Moskowitz 2001).  In other words, the culture 
seems to have a very tolerant and pragmatic view toward abortion within marriage. As 
long as abortion fits family interests, it is generally accepted. So I expect to see that 
nominal and secular people will be more likely to agree and obtain abortions.  
       However, compared with abortion inside marriage, abortion outside marriage is 
more likely to be viewed as immoral.  Out-of-wedlock pregnancy and abortion can bring 
tremendous shame to one’s family. In this study, I will only focus on abortion within 
marriage. In a future article, I will explore the association between religion and abortion 
outside of marriage in Taiwan.  
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Religion and abortion in Taiwan      
      Although certain types of traditional religions such as Buddhism might oppose 
abortion in theory, Buddhist organizations and clergy in East Asia have rarely articulated 
their anti-abortion positions (Tribe 1990). Buddhist leaders rarely make clear statements 
that abortion is killing. Furthermore, many Buddhist and Taoist temples in Taiwan 
actually provide rituals to bless aborted fetuses (嬰靈); such practices are becoming very 
popular (Moskowitz 2001). The main goal for such rituals is to bless the aborted fetuses 
via financial sacrifice from the mother (or parents). By making appeasement with the 
aborted fetus, the sin and guilt of the mother will be eliminated, and the well-being of the 
fetuses will be assured, so that she or he will not come back to interrupt or destroy the 
parent’s current life. Such practices may make abortions more acceptable among these 
traditional religions.  Moreover, because family harmony and obligation is often 
emphasized by those traditions, I expect that in Taiwan the nominal traditional 
religionists will be more likely to tolerate abortion, compared with Christians.  
      Further, because traditional religions in Chinese societies do not require regular 
attendance at a religious institution, there is rarely a solid institutional form of religion 
(Chiu 2004). Traditional religionists typically come to temples only on religious holidays 
or when there is an urgent need, such as sickness, preparing university entrance exams, 
opening a new businesses, etc (Chiu 2004). Nor do fellow believers typically form 
intense social networks with one another. Moreover, clergies do not function as principle 
givers or counselors, but more like doorkeepers who collect offerings and maintain the 
safety and daily routine of the temple. Thus, when there are neither clear beliefs opposing 
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abortion nor a strong religious community, the influence of religion on abortion might be 
weak.  
     New religious movements have been thriving in Taiwan in recent years. The largest 
one is Yi-Guan Dao (YGD). They are among the fastest growing religious groups, and 
have about 3.8% of the total population. YGD combines theologies from several major 
world religions, emphasizes divinely sanctioned morality, and often involves spiritual 
intervention in their activities. YGD strongly advocates traditional Confucian virtues such 
as filial piety, loyalty to family, and chastity to fight against the decaying morality in the 
surrounding secular world (Qin and Ai 2000). Their religious gatherings are intense and 
secretive, and members are required to follow a strict vegetarian diet (Jochim 2003; Fu 
1999; Qin and Ai 2000). Thus, I expect that YGD practioners will more likely to hold 
conservative family ideology, and more likely to oppose abortion, than members of other 
groups.    
   Taiwan churches, particularly the Taiwanese Presbyterian Church (TPC), have be a 
leading force promoting Taiwan’s political democratization (Chiu 2004; Huang 1996; 
Chao 2004; Lin 1994). They have been an active voice advocating Taiwan’s political 
reform and independence, promoting human rights for indigenous groups, and initiating 
the development of mass education and medical care in Taiwan. However, issues related 
to sexuality are rarely addressed publicly in Christian churches, except by the Taiwanese 
Catholic Bishop. Still, scholars indicate that Christians in Taiwan have distinct 
characteristics regarding family morality, sexuality, child-bearing, and ancestor worship 
(Chiu 1986).  Thus, I expect devout or conservative Christians to be more likely to 
oppose abortion. On the other hand, there may be divisions between devout and nominal 
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believers regarding abortion and sexuality. Many ordinary members may not follow 
official teachings from their religious institutions. For example, although Catholic 
doctrine condemns the use of birth control, in studies from the 1970s to 1980s, about 80% 
of Taiwanese Catholics think it is acceptable to use birth control (Chiu 2004).  
    The social-economic distribution of Christians may also influence their attitudes 
toward abortion. Taiwanese Christians are disproportionally middle class (Chao 2004, 
Swanson 1981). In the surveys Swanson conducted in the early 1980s, more than one 
third of church members had college degrees, and they were disproportionately 
professionals, government workers, officers, students, and other white-collar workers. 
Overall, I expect Taiwanese Christians will be similar to the Jews in the U.S., a minority, 
but with high social status and capital, high education rates and high educational 
aspirations for their children, and small family. Thus, I expect nominal Christians with 
their comparatively loose spiritual convictions and their western progressive ideas are 
more likely to support abortion.  
However, Most of the Christian churches in Taiwan come from conservative and 
evangelical backgrounds (Chao 2004). Among these fastest growing Taiwan churches are 
all the evangelical or charismatic ones who tend to hold conservative and more orthodoxy 
Christian theology (Chao 2004). Because of this, they tend to discourage ancestor 
worship and other folk religious practices, which can be considered as idolatry (Lutz 
1971). Not only do they discourage these folk religious practices, they also discourage 
churches using Confucianism as the primary morality guidance. Instead, the importance 
of the Bible is often addressed. They tend to reply on the biblical orthodoxy in a way to 
fight against the “eroding” influence of the surrounding secular and “superstitious” 
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culture. Because of this, I expect that Taiwan Christians especially devout Christians will 
be similar to their counterparts in the West that they will be more likely to hold 
traditional family and sexuality views, thus more likely to oppose abortion.     
H1: Taiwanese Christians, particularly devout believers, will be more likely to oppose 
abortion than other groups.  
H2: Taiwanese devout traditionalists and YGD will also be more likely to discourage 
abortion, and abort less.  
H2: Due to reproduction pressure and vague doctrine, nominal Chinese traditional 
religionists are more likely to approve abortion than other devout religious members. 




During the past two decades, Taiwan has had high quality surveys with measures 
of both religion and gender issues that are analogous to those in major U.S. surveys, but 
adapted to Chinese culture. This allows me to examine the religion-gender-family 
connection in a non-western context.  Our analysis draws on data from the 8th wave of 
the Knowledge of, Attitudes toward, and the Practice of Contraception Survey (KAP) in 
Taiwan, conducted in 1998 by the Taiwan Institute of Family Planning, a governmental 
institution under the Department of Health. Analogous to the National Survey of Family 
Growth in the U.S., the KAP collected data from a nationally representative sample of 
ever-married women aged 20-60 in Taiwan every 3-5 years since 1965. The KAP 
includes rich information on women’s marital and fertility histories, family planning 
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methods and contraception use, actual and desired number and sex of children, gender 
role attitudes, working histories, religious beliefs and practices, and family background. 
KAP provides incredible measures of women’s abortion history, motivations for abortion, 
and preference for sex of children. Being the most comprehensive data source on fertility 
and marriage in Taiwan, KAP enables me to examine how is religion associated with 
attitudes toward abortion and contraception use in a Chinese cultural context. The data 
also allow me to investigate the effects of other prevalent religious practices, such as 
ancestor worship, on abortion and birth control.  The data used in this study come from 
1998 KAP, the latest available year of data. After eliminating missing values, my 
working sample contains 2,720 cases. 
         Besides the quantitative data, I also conducted 22 in-depth interviews in 
Taipei with “knowledgeable informants” in June 2007. My 22 interviewees come from 
various religious and social backgrounds. My original sampling method of using the 
existing TSCS 2000 sampling list was not successful. Thus, in order to obtain a useful 
sample in a very limited time, Dr. Hei-yuan Chiu and other scholars in Taiwan, he has 
helped me construct a purposive sample taking the religion, gender, resident place, 
ethnicity, education and social background of respondents into consideration. My final 
sample included 22 successful interviews, including both clergies and lay worshippers 
from all the major religious groups I studied in the quantitative research. There are four 
Buddhists, including one master, one abbot, and two devoted lay Buddhists; there are 
three folk religion practioners, one is an accountant in a folk temple, one is a Taxi driver, 
and one runs a computer shop. There is one new religious movement (YGD) teacher; 
seven Catholics, including one priest, one nun, and five lay members from various social 
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background; and seven Protestants from various denominations, with two pastors and five 
lay protestants. My qualitative discussions are mainly based on these interviews.   
4.5 MEASUURES 
 
Dependent variables  
  
Attitudes toward abortion. The first set of the dependent variables relate to the level of 
disapproval toward abortion. Respondents were asked to report their levels of 
(dis)approval toward abortion under the following five circumstances: (a) “when a wife 
wants to space childbirths more widely;” (b) “when a couple does not want to have any 
more children, but did not use contraception;” (c) “when a wife used birth control, but the 
birth control failed and she became pregnant;” (d) “when a family has no financial ability 
to afford more children;” (e) “when an unmarried woman accidentally became pregnant 
with her boyfriend.” The response items are coded with the higher scores indicating more 
accepting views of abortion (from “strongly disapprove”=1 to “strongly approve” =5).  
 Reported number of abortions. One of the greatest advantage of this study is the data not 
only provide abortion attitudes but also actual abortion behavior. Number of abortions is 
calculated through pregnancy history. KAP asks respondents how did your xth pregnancy 
end: if she reported it ended in abortion I coded it as 1; then calculates the total number of 
abortions by summarizing the total number of abortions after all pregnancies.12 
 
                                                 
12  Timing of abortion. In order to further analyze the timing of abortion, in terms of whether respondent 
will choose an abortion after certain number of children or after certain number of sons, I also calculate 
series of dummy variables measuring first abortion after having no children, 1 child, 2 children, 3 children, 
and 4 children; and also a series of dummy variables indicating first abortion without a son, first abortion 
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Religion Measures  
Religious affiliation. Measuring religion is a complicated issue in the Chinese/Taiwanese 
context. Because the distinctions between different Chinese religious traditions are vague, 
even though in surveys people self-identify as either Taoists, Buddhists, and Folk 
religionists, in reality, there are no clear boundaries between these three groups especially 
for lay people. The deities of these three religions are not exclusive and the pragmatic 
orientation of Chinese traditional religions makes lay believers worship multiple deities at 
the same time. Lay believers are usually not very familiar with the doctrinal differences 
between specific religions; deities are worshipped as long as they are efficient in bringing 
blessings and protection. Thus, scholars tend to treat them under the broad rubric of 
“Chinese traditional religion.” In my analysis I did the same thing. I created a series of 
dummy variables for each religious affiliation and divided each tradition between devoted 
believers and nominal ones. Thus the final categories include: devout Christians, nominal 
Christians, Devout Chinese traditional religionists, nominal Chinese traditional 
religionists, YGD, and non-religious.  Devout Chinese traditional religionists is the 
largest group and the reference category in my analyses. 
Other covariates  
      I include relevant socio-demographic factors in my models, such as respondent’s 
age (measured in years), subjective household income, place of residence (1=rural, 
0=otherwise), education (measured in years), and a series of dummy variables for 
ethnicity ( Fukien=reference group, Hakka, Mainlanders, and Aboriginal).  
                                                                                                                                                 
after 1 son, after 2 sons, after 3 sons, and after 4 sons. However, I found no significant results in these 
analyses indicating religious variation in timing of abortion.    
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4.6  ANALYTIC STRATEGY  
 
     The analysis involves three steps: in Table 4.1, I provide the means and standard 
deviations of abortion attitudes by religion. In Table 4.2 to Table 4.6, I estimate ordered 
logistic regression models, predicting the net effects of religion on five indicators of 
attitudes toward abortion. In Table 4.7 using Poisson Regression Model (PMS), I 
examine the net effects of religion on actual reported numbers of abortions and timing of 
abortions. I use PMS because the dependent variable “number of abortion” is not 
normally distributed as shown in the following graph. It is a count variable with a low 
mean count (Scott and Long 2002). Most people (71%) have not had any abortions. The 
final sample includes 2,720 respondents. 
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[Table 4.1 about here] 
       Table 4.1 shows the comparisons of means and standard deviations of abortion 
attitudes by religion. I coded responses so that the higher score indicates higher levels of 
support for abortion. I also compared means using SCHEFFE tests in STATA. To save 
space, I omit the full table for the SCHEFFE tests. According to the results, YGD 
respondents have the lowest approval for abortion on most questions; and devout 
Christians show the second lowest scores on most questions. Although the differences of 
mean between YGD and devout Christians are not statistically significant, these groups 
are significantly lower than the other groups on all items. On the other hand, nominal 
Christians display the highest approval of abortion on most items, followed by the non-
religious and nominal traditionalists. However, the mean differences among these three 
groups are not significant. In other words, YGD and devout Christians are more likely to 
oppose abortion than nominal groups and secular people. 
 
[Table 4.2 to 4.6 about here] 
        Table 4.2 to Table 4.6 show results from the ordered logistic regression models 
examining religious effects on attitudes toward abortion. Table 4.2 examines religious 
effects on attitudes toward abortion for the purpose of spacing children. Table 4.3 
examines religious effects on attitudes toward abortion because respondents do not want 
any more children. Table 4.4 examines religious effects on attitudes toward abortion 
 95
because of birth control failure. Table 4.5 examines religious effects on attitudes toward 
abortion due to family financial constraint. Table 4.6 examines religious effects on 
attitudes toward abortion due to pregnancy outside of marriage. The first four 
justifications seem to deal with practical fertility concerns, while the fifth one also deals 
with moral aspects of unmarried pregnancy. Because the dependent variables are ordinal 
variables (from 1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree), ordered logistic regression 
models are the most appropriate (Powers and Yu 2000). In each of the five tables I 
include three models. Model 1 is the base model with only religion variables. In Model 2 
I added socio-demographic factors such as age, respondent’s education, estimated family 
income, ethnicity, participation in the labor force before first pregnancy, and whether 
respondent lives in cities. In Model 3, I also controlled for previous abortion experience 
measuring whether respondent had any abortion before or not. Coefficients and standard 
errors (in parenthesis) are reported in each table.  In all those five models, non-religious 
is the reference group. 13 
         The multivariate results confirmed the descriptive findings: in all of these five 
tables, devout Christians and YGD practioners are significantly more likely to oppose 
abortion, compared with secular non-religious people and nominal groups. Nominal 
groups such as nominal Christians and traditional religion groups do not display 
significantly different views toward abortion. Thus, contra expectations, devout 
traditionalists are not significantly more likely to discourage abortion compared with 
                                                 
13 In supplemental analyses, I use all the other groups as reference categories—for example, nominal 
traditional religionists and non-religious groups. The results are consistent with the above tables.  Devout 
Christians and YGD devotees are much more likely to oppose abortion than nominal religious believers and 
secular respondents. 
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nominal traditionalists or secular people. Thus, in Table 4.4 predicting abortion attitudes 
due to birth control failure, nominal Christians and nominal traditionalists have slightly 
more tolerant attitudes toward abortion compared with secular people and other groups. 
In other words, most of the original hypotheses are supported in that conservative 
Christians and YGD are more likely to oppose abortion, compared with secular and 
nominal groups.                 
       There are also some interesting results involving the other covariates. For 
example, more education is associated with more favorable attitudes about abortion; 
people who live in the cities are more likely to favor abortion compared with people who 
live in the rural areas; people who have had abortion before are significantly more likely 
to favor abortion under all circumstances, compared with people who report not having 
abortion before.  
[Table 4.7 about here] 
      Table 4.7 shows a Poisson regression model (PRM) examining religious effects 
on reported numbers of abortions. Interestingly, nominal Christians report having slightly 
higher numbers of abortion than secular respondents (CE=.44, p<.05), with all other 
socio-demographic factors considered. 
4.8 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
4.8.1 LIMITATION OF QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
      First, I have to acknowledge the limitations of this study: (1) limited religion 
measures. I only used two measures of religion, denomination and self-perceived 
“devotedness.” Because religious phenomena in Chinese societies are very different from 
the West, on affiliation measure cannot tease out the complexity of religious effect on 
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abortion in Taiwan. Further surveys with better religion measures are greatly needed. (2) 
Very small samples for certain religious groups. Christianity and YGD are minority 
religions. Christians (Protestant and Catholic together) make up no more than 5% of the 
Taiwanese population, and YGD is only about 3 percent of the population, thus the final 
number of observations included in the sample are very small. For example, I only have 
120 Christians and 40 YGD members vs. more than 2,000 Chinese traditional 
religionists. Thus comparisons among these groups are limited by these small N, potential 
significant findings might be suppressed because of large standard errors. (3) This study 
only includes a sample of married women in Taiwan. I will further explore religious 
effects on abortion with unmarried women in another paper. (4) In a separate paper, I will 
also explore the association between religious effects on son preference and sex-selective 
abortions.   
4.8.2 Field Interviews and Discussion  
 
My qualitative field research further examines the quantitative results. Consistent 
with the survey research, there are significant variations among different religious groups 
on their attitudes toward abortion.  
   For example, Mr. Chang, a new pastor for the Church of Revival, a small 
fundamentalist/evangelical church in Taipei city, expressed his opposition on abortion in 
all circumstances: “ Children are given by God...God has already known us even when 
we are in our mother’s womb… Any killing is not right.” Interestingly, he also explained 
“how” this kind of teaching is expressed. “Even though the church has strong opinion 
opposing abortion,” Mr. Chang said, “the church rarely directly opposes abortion in 
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sermons or in any public occasions.” When asking the reason, Mr. Chang explained. 
“Well, Taiwan society is still a traditional society, for the topics related to sexuality, 
people will still feel it is embarrassing or improper to talk about it directly…So 
sometimes we will mention this in private conversations, in counseling, or in small 
Sunday school classes.” This reveals a very typical dilemma these conservative churches 
face: they hold traditional views opposing abortion, on the hand, because they also have 
traditional or conservative cultural norms, they are very reluctant to address sexuality 
related issues publicly. Different from many conservative churches in the U.S. who tend 
to vocally oppose abortion, this doubly traditional character of Chinese conservative 
churches may hinder their direct influence on abortion issues.   
Similar to the fundamentalist/evangelical church pastor, the True Jesus Church 
member Mr. Hei also expressed similar attitudes toward abortion. The True Jesus Church 
is a fast growing but very conservative branch among Taiwan Protestant churches. Mr. 
Hei, a very devout Christian, goes to church at least five times per week, explained that 
his church strongly opposes abortion especially abortion due to sex outside of marriage, 
“because it implies sexual immorality.” In terms of abortion within marriage, he said with 
strong emotions, “Although the church does not emphasize it as much as abortion outside 
of marriage, it is still considered as a serious sin!” In his own life, he and his wife have 
four children. Originally they wanted no more than three kids, but his wife got pregnant 
again unexpectedly, and because they would not get an abortion, she gave birth to the 
forth child.  
      The YGD teacher I interviewed also expressed her opposition to abortion similar 
to those conservative Protestants. Ms. Bai, said: “Our temple focuses on teaching our 
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traditional virtues such as chastity and loyalty to one’s family. Abortion should be 
discouraged. You have heard so many stories nowadays about a high school girl or even a 
middle school girl got pregnant…the world is poisoning for our children…if we allow 
abortion, it will encourage their behaviors.” “What about abortion within marriage, for 
example a couple wants to abort because their contraception failed?” She responded. “We 
do not encourage abortion because abortion kills life…We have seen some of really 
heartbreaking Video programs showing how much a fetus suffers during abortion…” She 
also mentioned that during their seasonal classes they will show those anti-abortion 
programs to teenagers and adults. Similar to Christian churches, Ms. Bai also mentioned 
that they have many cell group programs. Through these cell groups, they often visit 
members’ homes, counsel their family lives, and if they found out someone wants to 
abort, they will pay special visit to help them make the “right” decision.   
       In my interviews, people also emphasized the impact of religion on the 
transformation of their attitudes toward abortion, which cannot be reflected by cross-
sectional survey data. For example, Ms. Wang, an active member of a large charismatic 
church in Taipei--when asked about her opinion about abortion-- she responded after a 
long pause. “Well, I have had two abortions before I was thirty five. At that time I was 
not a Christian. I would have made different choices if I were a Christian then.” She 
emphasized that her conversion to Christianity changed how she views abortion. “When I 
was pregnant at that moment, I found there are some abnormal symptoms of the fetuses. I 
did not have faith…My husband was not a Christian at that moment either. So we 
decided not to risk it and aborted the fetuses.” She added. “But now I so regret this, 
because now I know children are given by God, and that the mother does not encounter 
 100
fetal physical problems, people should not abort.” Now as a mother of two children and 
an active member in the church choir, she often volunteers to counsel younger sisters in 
church who express their desires to obtain abortions.  
My interviews also demonstrated the distinct variation among Taiwan Protestants. 
For example, Mr. Wei, a sixty years old pastor of a small Presbyterian church in Taipei, 
gave me a very different answers about abortion. He thinks abortion should be allowed 
for any reason. He explained why he believes so. “I have two sons, but my elder son died 
when he was only one year and seven month old. When he was born he already had a 
brain deficiency…At that moment, my wife and I lived in a small rural town in the south. 
If we could have accessed advanced technology or medical examination, we would have 
chose to abort the baby, rather than giving birth to him and letting everybody suffer…” 
He added. “Before I became a pastor, I have been a counselor in elementary and middle 
schools for thirty years. I have seen so many ‘problematic children’ who are actually the 
fruits of very problematic families…Our faith teaches us to be responsible, to care about 
others, so if the parents are not ready to have a child, nor ready to sacrifice for their kids, 
no matter whether they are married or not, they should choose to abort the baby rather 
than let him or her live… It is better to abort a fetus than letting a child grow up in 
unloving homes.” Thus, he agrees with abortion for any condition, no matter whether it is 
because pre-marital sex, or because of contraception failure within marriage, or just 
because parents feel they cannot afford another baby. In other words, different from his 
conservative counterparts, it seems that these social concerns have more weights on his 
attitudes than religious concern about “taking a life.” In a different setting, my 
conversations with two other members from this church show very similar attitudes 
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toward abortion. As one woman, Ms Hong, a member of this church, said: “We should 
not tell people what to do. Abortion is their own decision. The church should leave to the 
individuals to decide.”   
Scholars suggest that conservative religious teachings can function as a mechanism 
for building up a collective identity by asserting distinct moral boundaries (e.g., Wilcox 
2004). Although the data show association between religious background and abortion 
practices, they do confirm the idea that religion can function as an identity boundary as 
scholars suggest. On the other hand, nominal Christians may be less shaped by 
conservative theology, less monitored by their religious community regarding their 
religious practices, or encounter pressure to maintain a solid religious boundary with the 
secular surroundings. More importantly, as nominal Christians are disproportionate 
upper-middle to middle class members highly educated urban professionals, they may be 
more attracted to the “Westernness” or “modernness” associated with Christianity.  
They may also more likely to emphasize education achievement and maintaining 
comparative elite social status. Thus the pressure to raise “quality” children rather than 
“quantity” of children may influence them to favor abortion.  
I also interviewed a Buddhist authority, the executive Abbot of Zhong-Tai Buddhist 
Monastery, one of the four largest Buddhist lineages with 1,500 monks and nuns in 
residence and thousands of lay practioners throughout Taiwan. “What is your opinion 
about abortion? How does your temple address abortion issues?” Abbot Yun responded. 
“As a Zen Buddhist, we focus on meditation and reading (Buddhism) classics… The 
classics tell us that in each living features there is Buddha. Everybody can have a chance 
to become a Buddha…A sincere Buddhist does not kill…We hope our members 
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understand this…” Different from the conservative Protestants or the YGD member I 
interviewed, The Abbot mentioned this without a strong emotional attachment. He did 
not seem to be alarmed by this issue as other conservative members. When I further 
asked him whether the monastery has any classes or teachings specifically deal with 
abortion issues, Abbot Yun said they do not have any, but he emphasized that he hopes 
the members will understand this by themselves when studying the classics. As scholars 
mentioned, Chinese religious institutions have downplayed their positions regarding 
abortion issues. The passive attitudes the abbot showed is consistent with what scholars 
have found how typical Buddhist priesthood deal with these issues (Moskowitz 2001; 
Jiang 1996; Jones 1999). Further, as most Chinese traditional religious groups tend to be 
un-institutionalized and diffused (Yang 1967), most lay practioners come to participate in 
religious rituals without building up a strong social network through religious 
organizations, the institutional influence on abortion issues may be further limited.   
4.9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION       
 
In summary, utilizing a large nationally representative survey from Taiwan, I 
examine the impact of religion on abortion. The results demonstrate that conservative 
religious traditions, particularly devout Christians and New Religious Movement YGD 
practioners, are most likely to oppose abortion, compared with nominal and secular 
people. Those groups tend to emphasize the moral aspects of abortion, thus they 
discourage abortion motivated by pragmatic marital fertility concerns such as spacing 
children, birth control failure, or financial restraint, or abortion due to pregnancy outside 
of marriage. There is no significant difference between those conservative groups, nor 
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among the nominal and secular groups, while there are significant differences between 
those conservative parts from the nominal counterparts. When further exploring actual 
reported numbers of abortion, interestingly, nominal Christians in Taiwan report have 
slightly more abortions than secular groups, with other factors taken in control. However, 
there is no significant religious variation on timing of abortion, meaning religion does not 
seem to have significant association with abortion after certain number of children or 
certain number of sons according to these data.   
Study limitation and future directions 
(a) Limitation of measures: Although KAP has rich information about women’s 
pregnancy history and marital life, it has only very basic religion questions: affiliation 
and level of devoutness. There are three other questions about ancestor worship and 
Feng-shui practice, however, in my preliminary analyses none of these measures were 
significantly associated with any of the outcome variables. I think that future surveys 
with better measures for religious practices and beliefs are specially needed. For example, 
when dealing with abortion, religion questions that are related to understanding of life 
and death, life after death, spiritual beliefs, and folk rituals specially blessing aborted 
fetuses, are particularly important. It would also be useful to have open-ended questions 
asking respondent’s reasons for abortion. By doing so, scholars can have a better 
understanding of the mechanism of the religion-abortion association.  
     (b) This data only examine woman’s attitudes toward abortion. However, in the 
Chinese context abortion is often a family decision (Moskowitz 2001). Even the law 
requires a husband’s consent for obtaining an abortion (Hung 2004). Thus, future data 
that also include husband’s and other family member’s (such as in-law parents) attitudes 
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toward abortion are needed. It would be helpful if future pregnancy surveys asked 
questions about spouses’ and family members’ religious practices and beliefs. Thus, we 
could examine whether and how family influence women’s abortion attitudes and 
behavior.  
    (c) A third limitation of this study is that I only examine the association between 
religion and abortion among married women. In the future I want to expand the current 
study into examining the link between religion and abortion attitudes and behaviors 
among unmarried women, as the patterns of abortion of unmarried women may be very 
different from married women (Guttmacher Institute website). Married women may be 
more concerned about having a desired number of children and family financial 
constraints, while unmarried women may face more social pressure and stigma in dealing 
with pregnancy out of wed-lock. Thus, it will be interesting to examine whether religion 
influences people’s attitudes and behavior in the same way for unmarried women, 
whether the religion-abortion association will be stronger or weaker in dealing with 
sexual morality related abortions. Fortunately, KAP also has data of unmarried women 
that will allow me to examine this association.  
   (d) In the current study I only use KAP data from 1998. This only provides a snapshot 
of the association between religion and abortion. It cannot reflect how the religion-
abortion association changes over time. Thus, in future research I hope to examine the 
trend in the religion-abortion association using KAP data from 1965 to 1998 (or later if 
available) for both abortion attitudes and abortion behaviors.  
   (e) I would also like to expand my current research of the religion-abortion 
association in other East Asian societies such as Mainland China, Singapore, and South 
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Korea. According to Guttmacher Institute, about 60 percent of women in Asia have had 
an abortion, compared with 17 percent of women in Europe and five percent in other 
developed countries. It would be interesting to examine whether the findings in this study 
can be supported in other East Asian societies where similar cultural context are 
presented. I am interested in searching for data that have both religion and pregnancy 









Table 4.1: Comparison of Mean and Standard Deviation (in parenthesis) of Abortion 

















Devout Christian 2.17 (1.01) 2.27 (.99) 2.20 (.92) 2.92 (1.17) 2.77 (1.15) 75 
Nominal Christian  2.60 (1.19) 2.91 (1.18) 3.00 (1.22) 3.40 (1.12) 3.31 (1.12) 45 
Devout Traditional 2.36 (1.03) 2.57 (1.11) 2.62 (1.06) 3.31 (1.15) 3.11 (1.16) 1385 
Nominal Traditional 2.44 (1.07) 2.69 (1.13) 2.75 (1.09) 3.45 (1.08) 3.32 (1.07) 747 
YGD 1.85 (.77) 2.28 (1.18) 2.05 (1.01) 2.70 (1.32) 2.68 (1.10) 40 
Non-religious 2.45 (1.10) 2.73 (1.16) 2.67 (1.06) 3.45 (1.11) 3.26 (1.09) 497 
Total 2.39 (1.05) 2.62 (1.12) 2.65 (1.07) 3.36 (1.13) 3.18 (1.13) 2789 
 
Note: All attitude variables Ire coded from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicates a higher 



















Table 4.2: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitude toward 
Abortion for Spacing Children 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Devout Christian -.454 (.23) * -.530 (.24) * -.547 (.25) * 
Nominal Christian .272 (.29)  .234 (.31)  .156 (.30)  
Devout Traditional -.109 (.09)  .045 (.10)  .035 (.10)  
Nominal Traditional .022 (.11)  .085 (.11)  .075 (.11)  
YGD -.973 (.29) ** -.928 (.30) ** -.938 (.30) ** 
Education    .038 (.01) ** .039 (.01) *** 
Income    .047 (.04)  .041 (.05)  
work before 1st kid    -.052 (.07)  -.059 (.07)  
31-40    .179 (.11) + .069 (.11)  
41-50    .220 (.12) + .096 (.12)  
51-60    -.023 (.14)  -.119 (.14)  
Hakka    .116 (.10)  .112 (.10)  
Mainlander    .256 (.15) + .241 (.15)  
Aboriginal    .445 (.26) + .416 (.26)  
city    .065 (.08)  .021 (.08)  
Have had abortion        .853 (.08) *** 
-2 log likelihood 7695.4   7253.6   7147.2   

















Table 4.3: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitude toward Abortion for 
not Wanting More Children 
     
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Devout Christian -.690 (.22) ** -.723 (.24) ** -.755 (.24) ** 
Nominal Christian .315 (.28)  .296 (.30)  .242 (.29)  
devout Traditional -.219 (.09) * -.091 (.10)  -.095 (.10)  
Nominal 
Traditional -.041 (.10)  .009 (.11)  .006 (.11)  
YGD -.786 (.31) * -.744 (.31) * -.717 (.31) * 
Education    .053 (.01) *** .055 (.01) *** 
Income    .023 (.04)  .023 (.04)  
work before 1st kid    .118 (.07)  .115 (.07)  
31-40    .307 (.10) ** .201 (.10) + 
41-50    .432 (.11) *** .313 (.12) ** 
51-60    .168 (.14)  .071 (.14)  
Hakka    .029 (.10)  .038 (.10)  
Mainlander    .183 (.15)  .175 (.15)  
Aboriginal    .280 (.25)  .255 (.26)  
City    .050 (.08)  .000 (.08)  
Have had abortion        .892 (.08) *** 
-2 log likelihood 7968.4   7510.6   7398.4   














Table 4.4:  Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Abortion 
Due to Failed Birth Control 
 
    
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Devout Christian -.743 (.22) ** -.752 (.23) ** -.777 (.23) ** 
Nominal Christian .602 (.29) * .614 (.30) * .569 (.30) + 
devout Traditional -.067 (.09)  .036 (.10)  .049 (.10)  
Nominal Traditional .157 (.10)  .190 (.11) + .202 (.11) + 
YGD -1.113 (.30) *** -1.086 (.31) *** -1.042 (.31) ** 
education    .043 (.01) *** .044 (.01) *** 
income    .106 (.04) * .106 (.04) * 
work before 1st kid    -.019 (.07)  .115 (.07)  
31-40    .294 (.10) ** .183 (.10) + 
41-50    .411 (.11) *** .294 (.12) * 
51-60    .214 (.14)  .112 (.14)  
Hakka    .136 (.09)  .131 (.10)  
Mainlander    .076 (.15)  .058 (.15)  
Aboriginal    .273 (.26)  .262 (.26)  
city    -.112 (.08)  -.161 (.08) * 
Have had abortion        .852 (.08) *** 
-2 log likelihood 7964.1   7530.6   7420.4   












Table 4.5:   Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Abortion 
Due to Financial Constraint  
    
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Devout Christian -.820 (.22) *** -.783 (.24) ** -.772 (.24) ** 
Nominal Christian -.054 (.29)  -.072 (.30)  -.116 (.30)  
devout Traditional -.201 (.10) * -.048 (.10)  -.050 (.10)  
Nominal Traditional .021 (.11)  .090 (.11)  .090 (.11)  
YGD -1.163 (.31) *** -1.104 (.31) *** -1.096 (.31) *** 
Education    .065 (.01) *** .066 (.01) *** 
income    .070 (.05)  .064 (.05)  
work before 1st kid    .058 (.07)  -.017 (.07)  
31-40    .162 (.11)  .086 (.11)  
41-50    .107 (.12)  .013 (.12)  
51-60    -.071 (.14)  -.144 (.14)  
Hakka    -.270 (.10) ** -.274 (.10) ** 
Mainlander    -.101 (.15)  -.103 (.15)  
Aboriginal    .153 (.26)  .127 (.26)  
city    .183 (.08) * .158 (.08) * 
Have had abortion        .615 (.08) *** 
-2 log likelihood 7693.4   7236.6   7177.8   





Table 4.6:   Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Abortion 
of Unmarried Women Pregnant with Boyfriend   
       
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Devout Christian -.733 (.22) ** -.562 (.23) * -.551 (.23) * 
Nominal Christian .122 (.28)  .231 (.29)  .188 (.29)  
devout Traditional -.203 (.09) * -.030 (.10)  -.035 (.10)  
Nominal Traditional .116 (.10)  .214 (.10) * .216 (.10) * 
YGD -.868 (.29) ** -.835 (.29) ** -.814 (.29) ** 
Education    .067 (.01) *** .068 (.01) *** 
Income    .098 (.04) * .094 (.04) * 
work before 1st kid    .063 (.07)  .068 (.07)  
31-40    .243 (.10) * .171 (.10)  
41-50    .321 (.12) ** .238 (.12) * 
51-60    .261 (.14) + .200 (.14)  
Hakka    -.098 (.10)  -.099 (.10)  
Mainlander    .097 (.14)  .096 (.14)  
Aboriginal    -.303 (.27)  -.327 (.27)  
City    .300 (.08) *** .267 (.08) *** 
Have had abortion        .542 (.08) *** 
-2 log likelihood 8386.2   7889.8   7845.8   












Table 4.7:   Poisson Regression Model (PRM) 
Predicting Numbers of Abortion by Religion 
and Other Factors 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Devout Christian .280 (.17)  .086 (.19)  
Nominal Christian .494 (.20) * .439 (.20) * 
devout Traditional .120 (.08)  .094 (.09)  
Nominal Traditional .064 (.09)  .065 (.09)  
YGD -.116 (.28)  -.144 (.28)  
Education    .007 (.01)  
Income    .038 (.04)  
work before 1st kid   -.159 (.06) ** 
31-40    .739 (.11) *** 
41-50    .887 (.12) *** 
51-60    .769 (.13) *** 
Hakka    .020 (.08)  
Mainlander    .157 (.11)  
Aboriginal    .262 (.20)  
City    .165 (.07) * 
-2log likelihood 5120.8   4889.7   
LR chi2 8.6   94.0   
Model P value .1   .0   






CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
5.1 SUMMARY OF STUDY  
 
This study is to examine the effects of religion on gender and family issues in 
Taiwan. I explore whether religion matters and how religion is associated with gender 
relations, particularly in the areas of family gender roles, educational aspirations, and 
abortion attitudes and decisions. This study is not to explain the total variation in social 
influences on gender issues. There are may other social factors such as urbanization, 
participation in the labor force and family status which may also influence gender 
equality in Taiwan; however these topics are not the focus of this dissertation.  
 Based on data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) and the Knowledge 
of, Attitudes toward, and the Practice of Contraception Survey (KAP), my findings show 
that religion is significantly associated with gender roles and family relations in Taiwan. 
Conservative religious groups such as Taiwan Protestants and Yi-Guan-Dao members are 
more likely to support traditional gender role ideologies and traditional norms regarding 
abortion and sexuality, while Catholics and secular groups tend to hold more liberal 
attitudes than their conservative counterparts.  
On attitudes toward education, there is no significant gender gap among religious 
groups; the difference lies in overall educational aspirations. Taiwan Protestants show the 
highest aspirations and Yi-Guan-Dao members the lowest; Catholics and Chinese 
religionists are in the middle and do not have significantly differences in their educational 
attitudes. My field interviews in Taiwan further supported these findings.  
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One unexpected finding is that nominal Christians actually reported slightly more 
abortions than others. This may be due to the very small N in the sample; but it may also 
be because nominal Christians are less affected by conservative Biblical teachings and 
have more liberal views regarding abortion and sexuality. Their disproportionately 
middle or upper middle social status and their closeness with “Western” culture, may 
further accentuate the liberal practices concerning family and fertility issues.  
W. Bradford Wilcox and other scholars argue that the reason why these conservative 
groups focus on traditional ideology is that it functions as a symbolic boundary which 
helps them distinguish themselves from the surrounding secular culture (Wilcox 2004). 
However, there may be a loose connection between ideologiy and practice in the day-to-
day life of members.  
Another unanticipated finding is that unlike conservative Protestants in the West 
(e.g., Darnell and Sherkat 1997, Sherkat and Darnell 1999), Protestants in Taiwan have 
the highest educational aspirations for both boys and girls despite their conservative 
gender and sexuality ideologies. This may be partly due to the intimate relation between 
Protestantism and the development of Taiwan’s modern education. Because early 
Protestant missionaries promoting mass education in Taiwan, Taiwanese Protestants may 
have more positive attitudes toward modern education. Moreover, as Christianity is often 
associated with Western civilization in non-western societies, Christians in Taiwan may 
further welcome modern education to resist the over-whelming influence of 
“superstitious” folk culture. Their minority status may further pressure them toward 
greater social and educational achievement like Jews in the U.S.   
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5.2 SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE RELIGION, GENDER, AND FAMILY ASSOCIATION   
 
Theological Beliefs and Perception toward Family Modernization 
 
Consistent with the literature in the U.S., conservative groups such as 
fundamentalist/evangelical Protestants, are more likely to hold traditional gender and 
family ideologies compared with other religious groups (Wilcox 2004). They are more 
likely to think modernization is “eroding” traditional family life, destroying marriages 
and family stability, and bringing harm to children. According to my study, it seems that 
conservative groups also tend to draw on religious concerns such as life and death issue, 
or Biblical principles to resist family “modernization,” while liberal religionists seem to 
rely more on humanitarian and social concerns to develop their response to 
modernization.  
Instead of being changed by the secular culture, conservative groups emphasize their 
transformation from a secular perspective back to religious orthodox (Biblical guidance). 
On the other hand, Catholics and mainline Protestants (in my case the Taiwan 
Presbyterians) tend to accommodate to the changing family culture; they tend to feel 
more comfortable with the generic cultural norms and more likely to welcome them. This 
is also consistent with the situation in the West.  
However, it seems that religion has greater influence over beliefs than practice. This 
is demonstrated by one of the unanticipated findings in this dissertation: although devout 
Christians and YGD members tend to strongly oppose abortion, there is no significant 
difference in the actual number of abortions between religious groups.  
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The Influence of Religious Community  
This study shows that religion has the strongest association with gender and family 
relations for members of religious groups with intense religious networks and community 
life, such as conservative Protestants (CP) and YGD members. Although CPs and YGD 
members have very different theological beliefs, they are similar organizationally. Both 
emphasize close social networks among members and between clergies and laity. Both 
require frequent attendance to a fixed religious place (temple or church) and have 
frequent gatherings at member’s or teacher’s homes. The clergy or elders I interviewed 
from both traditions mention their frequent home visits to members as an effective way of 
mentoring. Such close networks also function as an accountability system to help 
members understand the religious teachings and solve family issues according to the 
principles given by these religious organizations (e.g., dealing with an abortion).  
On the other hand, Chinese traditional religionists, and even Catholics, do not have 
such strong community life and organizational contacts. It seems this lack of close 
network accentuates the loose connection between church/temple teaching and laity’s 
family practices. Because mainstream folk and traditional Chinese religions tend to be 
diffused, non-institutional and have vague ethical teachings, their impact over gender 
issues and family life seems to be weak. Unlike the dominant religious groups in the 
West or the highly organized small conservative groups in Taiwan, the diffused nature of 
Chinese religions dissipates influence over both member’s family behaviors and the 
ability to mobilize social movements to influence legislation and public opinion.. Large 
traditional organizations such as Zhong-Tai Monestry, Ci-Zi Charity Association, 
Buddhist Light Mountain, Xing-Tian Temple, etc, are generally indifferent to family and 
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moral issues (Moskowitz 2001). The influence of these religions over people’s gender 
and family relations does not seem to be strong.  
SES and Cultural Background 
 
On the other hand, it may be that differences in the socio-demographic character of 
different religious groups indirectly influences these outcomes. For example, Christians 
in Taiwan are disproportionately from the middle or upper-middle classes, tend to have 
more education, and tend to work in government or other white-collar professions. Even 
after controlling for respondent’s current SES and education, Christians are still very 
different – especially in their educational attitudes. However, this could result from 
generations of accumulated status and educational advantage. The effect of this family 
background and this accumulated cultural or social capital needs more scholarly attention.  
At the time of the survey, respondents’ opinions may be influenced not only by their 
own religion and SES, but also the accumulated cultural capital they receive from their 
religious community. For example, fellow religious members may have more contacts 
with the West, have a high proportion of friends who have studied or lived abroad, etc. 
Churches may often bring in speakers from other countries, introduce materials from the 
U.S. or other countries, provide library facility to read books or materials in other 
languages, etc. These may not only provide a “second-education” resource outside of 
one’s formal education, it may also influence respondent’s views on family and gender 
relations. Further research needs to better measure and examine such “indirect” influence 
of religious or cultural capital that are associated with certain religious traditions.    
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5.3 METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION  
 
This dissertation makes several methodological contributions. First, it contributes to 
a new field: the empirical study of religion and family life in East Asia. This is the first 
empirical study utilizing large-scale representative survey data to examine the association 
between religion and gender and family issues in a Chinese society. The current Chinese 
literature is dominated by ethnographic study of religion and descriptive studies of 
religious data from surveys without examining religion’s influence in other fields of 
human life.  
Second, this dissertation tests theories developed in the Judeo-Christian West, to see 
how they work in a non-Judeo-Christian context. This helps us understand how much of 
differences found between religious groups are related to inherent aspects of that 
tradition, and how much are they are associated with unmeasured contextual factors.  
Third, this study combines qualitative and quantitative research. The qualitative 
research enriches the quantitative arguments and helps us understand the deeper 
mechanisms through which religion influences gender and family life in Taiwan. 
Hopefully, this dissertation will inspire future research using both methods to study 
religious influences on human life in societies around the world.  
5.4 Future Research Plan  
 
One limitations of this cross-sectional study is that I can only look at a snapshot of 
the association between religion and gender and family issues in a certain year. Thus, it is 
difficult to understand changes in the association between religion and family. This is 
particularly problematic because Taiwan has gone through tremendous social and 
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economic change in the past several decades. Thus, in future research, I plan to examine 
the changing religion-family association using data from 1984 to 2009 in TSCS, and from 
1965 to 1998 (or even later) in KAP. Has religions influence increased or decreased? 
What is likely to happen to the religion and family association in the future? In order to 
answer these questions, trend analysis using data from different years are needed.  
Another limitation of this study is the very small N for minority religious groups like 
Protestants, Catholics and YGD members. Although these small groups seem to have 
extremely interesting and distinctive characteristics, they are less than five percent of 
entire population, thus the number of respondents in each year is very small. This 
prevents testing distinctions between Presbyterians and other Taiwanese Protestants or 
between indigenous Christians and Chinese Christians, for example.  
Fortunately, both TSCS and KAP are repeated cross-sectional data with many 
repeated questions in different years. Thus, in future research I plan to pool several years 
of data and reexamine the religion and family association using a larger sample. 
Currently, TSCS has data from 1984 to 2004, but they are already preparing the 2006 to 
2009 data with another module focused on religion and culture (for 2009). Thus, it will be 
promising to reexamine these findings using a bigger sample and more detailed 
distinctions.  
I also plan to examine some subgroup variation using these pooled data. For 
example, how do men and women differ within each religious groups in their views about 
gender and family issues? Is it possible that religion has a stronger association with 
women’s beliefs than with men’s? Moreover, many demographic studies suggest there is 
great variation in their attitudes toward family life, gender roles, sexuality, and 
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educational aspirations. Is religion more influential among people from certain age 
groups or cohorts? Or is religion’s effect mediated or buffered by education?  
Another problem is the limited measures of religion on surveys that ask about “non-
religious” attitudes and behaviors. The religion questions are all clustered in the religion 
modules that have very limited measures for other domains of human life. Unfortunately, 
the family and culture modules only have one of two basic religion questions – affiliation 
and importance of religion. Data that has both good measures on religion and family or 
gender issues are needed. In response to this problem, I wish the following aspects of 
religion questions would be covered:  
(a) Family religious practices:  
It would be interesting to also know respondent’s spouse’s religion, parent’s religion, 
and the religious beliefs and practices of respondent’s close friends. Numerous studies in 
the U.S. have shown the important association between spouse’s religious practices, the 
homogeny of spouse’s religious beliefs and family practices such as household division 
of labor, gender role attitudes, marital quality, etc. Thus, it will be particularly interesting 
to see how spouse’s religion and compatibility of religion among spouses influence other 
family practices in Chinese societies. Also, numerous studies in the West have shown the 
strong link between parent’s religious beliefs and practices and their long-term influence 
on their children’s attitudes and behaviors. It would be interesting to examine how family 





(b) Religious conversion and family life 
One of the themes that constantly emerged in my interviews is the influence of 
religious conversion on people’s attitudes and family practices. The devout believers I 
interviewed mentioned how their views were changed because of their conversion, and 
that they believe and behave differently now because of their religious transformation. 
However, the current survey data do not allow me to examine this issue. I hope future 
religion surveys will include questions covering conversion experiences (if there is any). 
Even better, with panel studies scholars can examine how religion influences individual’s 
attitudes or family practice over time.  
(c) Religion and media  
When reflecting upon how researchers can capture the vivid religious phenomena 
in contemporary Chinese societies, I think it would be useful to analyze the consumption 
of religious media. From my field research in Taiwan and my experience in Mainland 
China, it seems that religious practices that go beyond the “traditional format” are 
particularly attractive to young generations, especially among people who “live” on the 
computer, You-Tube, and television.  
In Taiwan, not only are temples and churches everywhere, religious channels are 
thriving. Among the regular cable programs, there are two Christian channels, several 
Buddhist television, and various religious programs on regular channels. It would be very 
useful to measure the frequency with which people watch these media programs, such as 
how often do they watch religious channels, how long do they watch these programs, 
how often do they visit religious websites, how often do they participate in online 
religious forums, participating in online religious rituals (such as lighting Buddhist oil, 
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reading Sutras with others, participating in Bible Study online, giving donations online); 
or the amount of religious newspapers or books they purchase or read.  
In places where traditional religious organizations are regulated (such as in 
mainland China), or young professionals can not easy to attend fixed religious services 
because of busy lifestyles or long work hours, this type of “virtual” religious practice may 
be particularly significance (Wei 2005). Thus, it would be interesting to examine this type 
of religious behaviors together with traditional religious activities, so that we can have a 
more comprehensive look at how religion may influence attitudes.   
Extension of Research Interest  
 
Besides my current research topics, I would also like to explore the following 
topics:  
(a) Religion, Perception of Marriage, and Desire for Children in Chinese societies: 
  Like other East Asian societies, Taiwan is still a traditional society where marriage is 
almost universal. However, the desire for and fulfillment of marriage can mean many 
things: to fulfill a family’s need to continue their family line, to have children, to have 
financial security, to fulfill social expectations of being a good person, etc. As part of the 
family modernization process, Taiwanese may also start to focus on the link between 
marriage and individual happiness, mutual love, and friendship. Many young people have 
started to delay marriage, and increased numbers of young people choose to have no-
marriage lifestyle. Thus, it will be interesting to know whether there is any association 
between religious beliefs and practices and perceptions of marriage and desire for 
marriage. Related to this, it will be interesting to examine how religion influences the 
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desire for children and size of family. Do certain religious groups have stronger 
preference for sons, or desiring more children, while others desire smaller families? As 
Taiwan’s fertility has already dropped below replacement level, it will be important to 
know how religion is associated with people’s desire and decision for fertility.  
(b) Religion, divorce, and sexual morality in Chinese societies 
    I plan to explore the link between attitudes toward divorce, extra marital affairs, and 
other sexuality related topics in Taiwan and Mainland China. Although in these societies, 
economic and living standards have increased, family morality seems to be loose. As 
scholars argue that a sexual transition and revolution is well underway in urban China, 
the morality regarding sexuality has become increasingly permissive (Parish et.al. 2007). 
The rates of divorce, cohabitation, extra-marital affairs, and pornography use are 
increasing at the same time. As in the West, religion has been one important force in 
producing and legitimizing sexual morality, it will be interesting to examine whether 
religion and sexuality have such association in modern Chinese societies.   
 (c) Religion, intergenerational living arrangement, and child-rearing in Chinese societies  
In the Bible it says, “A man should leave his father and mother and cleave to his 
wife,” while in Chinese societies elder parents always live with their sons, especially their 
oldest son. This is one of the core practices for filial piety. Although Taiwan has become 
a very modernized and urbanized society, scholars still report that majority of Taiwan 
population live with their elder parents in the same household (e.g., Yi 2002). So it will 
be interesting to see whether religion will influence living arrangement in China. More 
specifically, whether Taiwanese Christians will have different patterns of living 
arrangement compared with Taiwan’s traditional Chinese religionists and YGD members; 
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whether Taiwan Christians are more likely to live separately from their elder parents, or if 
their “biblical concern” may be comprised under Chinese filial piety culture and limited 
living housing conditions in Taiwan. Also related to this, how do different religions 
influence child-rearing style (such as authoritarian, authoritative, and permissive)? Do 
Christians favor “western” ways of rearing children, while Chinese traditional religionists 
hold more orthodox “Confucian” principles in rearing children?    
   In all, although religion has been flourishing in Taiwan, China, and East Asian 
countries, the empirical study of religion in Chinese societies is still in its infancy. To 
date, sociology of religion in East Asia still has clear separations both between 
quantitative and qualitative research and between research on religion and research on 
demography and the family. In both Chinese and English languages there is almost no 
empirical research about the association between religion and family issues either by 
religion scholars or by family or gender scholars. I hope this study will encourage more 











Appendix A: Basic Interviewee Information 
 
     





1 Mr. L.Chang Protestant Fundamentalist/Evangelical Pastor Married / Masters 
2 Mr.. Y. Chang Protestant Fundamentalist/Evangelical Lay elder  Married  
Computer 
engineer  Bachelor  
3 Ms. Li Protestant Fundamentalist/Evangelical Member  Single Export business Bachelor  
4 Mr. Wei Protestant Presbyterian  Pastor Married ／ Masters 
5 Ms. Chang Protestant Presbyterian  Member Married Sales Junior college  
6 Ms. Wang Protestant Charismatic  Lay leader Married Government accounting 
Junior 
college 
7 Mr. Hei Protestant Conservative Member  Married Security manager 
Junior 
college 
8 Mr. Chen  Catholic ／ Member Married Government  officer 
Junior 
college  
9 Mr.s Chen  Catholic ／ Member Married Government  officer 
Junior 
college 





11 Ms. Mei Catholic ／ Member  Separated  School principle   Bachelor  
12 Ms. Gao Catholic ／ Lay leader Married Homemaker Masters 
13 Father Wu Catholic ／ Priest Single ／ Bachelor  
14 Ms. Ai Catholic ／ Nun  Single ／ High school 
15 Ms. Bai Yi-Guan-Dao Chong-De lineage Lecturer Single ／ 
Junior 
college 
16 Ms. Wang Buddhist Independent  ／ Married Homemaker Bachelor  
17 Ms. Zeng  Buddhist independent  ／ Widowed Real estate High school 
18 Master Yun Buddhist ／ 
Abbot/ 
Master Single ／ Masters 





20 Mr. Tai  Folk/Taoist ／ ／ Married Computer store owner High school 
21 Mr. Qi Folk/Taoist ／ ／ Single Taxi driver Military school 





Appendix B: Comparison of Mean and Standard Deviation of Gender 
Role Attitudes by Religion (TSCS 2002) 
    Catholic Protestant Traditional YGD  Non-religious 
women work Mean 3.34 3.17 3.16 2.94 3.03 
bad for kids S.D. (.91) (.99) (.97) (.89) (.91) 
  Min. 2 1 1 1 1 
  Max. 5 5 5 4 5 
women work Mean 2.71 2.79 2.6 2.39 2.52 
harm family S.D. (.93) (.96) (.89) (.64) (.87) 
  Min. 1 1 1 2 1 
  Max. 5 5 5 4 5 
women want Mean 3.51 3.75 3.77 3.69 3.62 
family and 
kids S.D. (.78) (.88) (.76) (.71) (.80) 
  Min. 2 1 1 2 1 
  Max. 5 5 5 5 5 
Both Mean 4.14 3.75 3.88 4.03 3.88 
Contribute S.D. (.81) (.76) (.74) (.61) (.75) 
Financially Min. 1 2 2 3 2 
  Max. 5 5 5 5 5 
Men as Mean 3.57 3.16 3.23 3.33 2.93 
Breadwinner  S.D. (1.19) (1.10) (1.03) (1.17) (.99) 
 Min. 1 1 1 1 1 
  Max. 5 5 5 5 5 
men do more Mean 3.63 3.35 3.25 3.16 3.35 
Housework S.D. (.97) (.94) (.92) (.84) (.85) 
  Min. 2 1 1 2 1 
  Max. 5 5 5 5 5 
men spend  Mean 3.77 3.31 3.35 3.44 3.45 
more time S.D. (.91) (.95) (.88) (.81) (.79) 
childrearing Min. 2 1 1 2 2 
  Max. 5 5 5 5 5 




Appendix C:  Cross-tabulation of Religion and Ethnicity in TSCS 2000 
 
Freq\Row\Col Ethnicity 
Religion Minnan Hakka Mainlander Aboriginal Total 
Devout 
Traditional 518 57 47 2 624 
  83.01% 9.13% 7.53% 0.32% 100% 
  37.95% 27.94% 18.43% 4.65% 33.42% 
Nominal 
Traditional 546 81 78 2 707 
  77.23% 11.46% 11.03% 0.28% 100% 
  40% 39.71% 30.59% 4.65% 37.87% 
Catholic 3 0 7 16 26 
  11.54% 0% 26.92% 61.54% 100% 
  0.22% 0% 2.75% 37.21% 1.39% 
Protestant 37 3 27 23 90 
  41.11% 3.33% 30% 25.56% 100% 
  2.71% 1.47% 10.59% 53.49% 4.82 
YGD 32 4 5 0 41 
  78.05% 9.76% 12.20% 0% 100% 
  2.34% 1.96% 1.96% 0% 2.20% 
Nonreligious 229 59 91 0 379 
  60.42% 15.57% 24.01% 0% 100% 
  16.78% 28.92% 35.69% 0% 20.30% 
Total 1,365 204 255 43 1,867 
  73.11% 10.93% 13.66% 2.30% 100% 
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